Hart v. State
75 Wis. 2d 371, 1977 Wisc. LEXIS 1425, 249 N.W.2d 810 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
In a criminal prosecution for homicide by negligent use of a vehicle, evidence of a defendant's driving conduct or practices that occurred at a substantial distance or time before the accident is generally inadmissible if it is too remote to be logically connected to the accident scene or to prove the specific acts of negligence causing the death.
Facts:
- On June 12, 1974, David Weidner, age sixteen, was riding his bicycle west on Highway 18 in the town of Sullivan, Jefferson County.
- Richard C. Hart was driving his automobile west on Highway 18, proceeding in the same direction as Weidner.
- As Hart was in the process of overtaking Weidner near an intersection, Weidner turned left, apparently intending to enter Highland Drive.
- Hart's vehicle struck Weidner, throwing him from his bicycle.
- Weidner died immediately or within minutes after the collision.
- The collision occurred in an intersection on a segment of Highway 18 known to Hart, which had heavy traffic, many curves, and hills.
- The posted speed limit in this region was 55 miles per hour.
- Hart admitted to driving 60 miles per hour at the hillcrest just before the collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Richard C. Hart was charged with violation of Wis. Stat. sec. 940.08 (homicide by negligent use of a vehicle) in county court.
- The county court conducted a jury trial on October 4 and 8, 1974, which resulted in a guilty verdict.
- The county court heard and denied motions after verdict on November 19, 1974.
- On December 3, 1974, the county court entered a judgment of conviction, placing Hart on two years' probation, with a condition of six months incarceration in county jail, and revoking his driving privileges for one year.
- Hart appealed his conviction to the circuit court (appellant Richard C. Hart, appellee State).
- The circuit court affirmed the conviction by decision rendered June 16, 1975, and order dated July 7, 1975.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err by admitting testimony regarding the defendant's driving speed, disregard of traffic signs, and general driving practices that occurred at locations substantially distant from and prior to the accident, where such evidence was not logically connected to the defendant's conduct at the scene and its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice?
Opinions:
Majority - Abrahamson, J.
Yes, the county court erred by allowing the admission of testimony from Jaeger and Hoffman regarding Richard C. Hart's driving conduct and practices that were too remote from the accident scene, and this error was not harmless, requiring reversal. The court defined "high degree of negligence" under Wis. Stat. sec. 940.08 as an objective standard, meaning conduct that demonstrates ordinary negligence to a high degree, creating an unreasonable risk and high probability of death or great bodily harm to another, as measured by an objective reasonable person test. This standard focuses on the risk of harm, not the actor's mental state. The court established that evidence of prior driving conduct is admissible only if there is a logical or rational connection between the observed conduct and the events at the accident scene, allowing an inference that the conduct continued. Remoteness, particularly for changeable conditions like speed, significantly reduces probative value. While testimony from Nelson and Sandvig about Hart's speed and passing within one-quarter mile of the accident was admissible due to constant observation and inferred continuity, the testimony from Jaeger and Hoffman about Hart driving 80 mph, running stop signs, and tailgating 12.5 miles from the accident was inadmissible. This remote testimony lacked a basis for inferring continuity to the accident scene and served improperly as character evidence, suggesting Hart was a "careless driver" in general. Although the defense attempted to discredit Hoffman on cross-examination, inadvertently opening the door to further testimony about Hart's general driving habits, this was ultimately tainted by the initial improper admission of Hoffman's remote direct testimony. The court concluded that the improper admission of Hoffman's and Jaeger's testimony was not harmless error because it likely prejudiced the jury by portraying Hart as a "generally bad actor," especially given the tragic death of a young boy, thereby changing the basic tenor of the trial. However, the court also found that, excluding the improperly admitted evidence, there was sufficient credible evidence (such as Hart's speed of 65 mph while passing in a no-passing zone near an intersection, and his failure to see the bicyclist earlier) to support a finding of high degree of negligence and causation, thus allowing for a new trial without violating double jeopardy.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the standard for admitting prior driving conduct evidence in criminal negligence cases in Wisconsin. It emphasizes that such evidence must be directly relevant and proximate to the incident, demonstrating a logical connection and continuity of conduct to avoid undue prejudice. By explicitly distinguishing between admissible proximate evidence and inadmissible remote evidence, the court reinforces the principle that criminal convictions must be based on specific conduct directly related to the charged crime, rather than general character or propensity. Furthermore, the decision reiterates that a victim's contributory negligence does not serve as a defense in criminal negligence prosecutions, ensuring that liability remains focused on the defendant's blameworthy conduct.
