Hart v. Keenan Properties, Inc.
May 21, 2020 (2020)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A witness's testimony describing a company's name and logo on a document is not hearsay when it is offered as circumstantial evidence of identity to link the company to goods delivered with the document, rather than to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the words on the document.
Facts:
- From September 1976 to March 1977, Frank Hart worked for Christeve Corporation installing asbestos-cement pipes in McKinleyville.
- Hart's job required him to cut and bevel the pipes, a process that released asbestos dust.
- Keenan Pipe and Supply was a wholesale distributor of asbestos-cement pipe and used a distinctive logo featuring the letter 'K' designed to look like a pipe inside a circle.
- John Glamuzina, Hart's foreman, was responsible for receiving pipe deliveries at the worksite.
- Upon delivery, Glamuzina would check the accompanying invoice to ensure the supplies listed matched the items being delivered before signing for them.
- Glamuzina testified that he recalled seeing the name 'Keenan' and its distinctive 'K' logo on invoices that accompanied pipe deliveries for the McKinleyville project.
- Christeve's bookkeeper, Olga Mitrovich, also testified that she remembered Keenan's unique logo because she knew Christeve dealt with the company.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank and Cynthia Hart sued Keenan Properties, Inc. and other entities in Alameda County Superior Court, a state trial court.
- Before trial, Keenan filed a motion to exclude the testimony of John Glamuzina regarding the invoices, arguing it was inadmissible hearsay.
- The trial court denied Keenan's motion, ruling the testimony was admissible non-hearsay circumstantial evidence of identity.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of the Harts, specifically finding that Hart was exposed to asbestos from pipe supplied by Keenan, and the trial court entered a judgment against Keenan.
- Keenan, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Glamuzina's testimony about the invoices constituted inadmissible hearsay.
- The Harts then successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of California for review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a witness's testimony describing a company's name and logo on an invoice, offered to identify the supplier of goods delivered with that invoice, constitute inadmissible hearsay?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Corrigan
No. The witness's testimony describing the name and logo on the invoices was not inadmissible hearsay because it was properly admitted as circumstantial evidence of identity. The testimony was not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted in the invoice, such as that the company was definitively named 'Keenan' or that the invoice's contents were accurate statements of a transaction. Instead, the presence of the recognizable name and logo on documents accompanying a pipe delivery served as a non-hearsay, circumstantial link between Keenan and the pipes Hart handled. The court reasoned that the evidence's relevance is independent of the truth of the words; the unique identifiers (the name and logo) function like a distinctive mark to connect Keenan to the pipes, similar to how finding a person's driver's license at a scene links them to that location. The testimony's purpose was to establish this link, a purpose it could serve regardless of whether the jury believed the content of the invoice to be true.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the application of the hearsay rule to corporate branding and identifiers on documents, particularly in historical tort cases where original evidence is lost. It establishes that a witness's recollection of a name or logo can be admissible as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence to prove identity or a link between a party and an event. This ruling is significant for plaintiffs in toxic tort and products liability cases who must often rely on decades-old memories to establish exposure and causation. By categorizing such testimony as circumstantial evidence of a link rather than proof of the document's content, the court lowers the barrier for admissibility and shifts the inquiry to the evidence's weight and the witness's credibility, which are matters for the jury to decide.
