Hart v. Geysel
294 P. 570 (1930)
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Rule of Law:
A person who consents to and engages in an illegal act, such as a prize fight, is barred from recovering civil damages for injuries sustained during that act, provided the injuries were not the result of excessive force, anger, or a malicious intent to cause serious harm.
Facts:
- On February 5, 1929, Hamilton I. Cartwright and Cecil Geysel voluntarily agreed to participate in a prize fight in Seattle.
- The prize fight was an illegal activity under state law.
- During the fight, Geysel struck Cartwright with a blow.
- The blow from Geysel caused Cartwright's death.
- There were no circumstances suggesting the fight involved anger, a malicious intent to seriously injure, or the use of excessive force by either participant.
Procedural Posture:
- The administrator of Hamilton I. Cartwright's estate filed a wrongful death action against Cecil Geysel and others in a Washington state trial court.
- Each defendant filed a demurrer (a motion to dismiss) to the amended complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- The trial court sustained the demurrers.
- The plaintiff refused to amend the complaint further and elected to stand on the existing one.
- The trial court entered a final judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action.
- The plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the judgment of dismissal to the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Does a person's consent to engage in an illegal prize fight bar a subsequent civil action for wrongful death resulting from injuries sustained during that fight, where there is no allegation of excessive force, anger, or malicious intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Main, J.
Yes. A person who consents to participate in an unlawful prize fight is barred from bringing a civil action for injuries sustained, as long as those injuries are a natural result of the combat. The court declined to follow the "majority rule," which holds that consent is no defense to an illegal act. Instead, it reasoned that two fundamental legal principles prevent recovery: 1) a person who consents to an invasion of their rights cannot later complain about it (volenti non fit injuria), and 2) a person should not be allowed to profit from their own wrongdoing. Because Cartwright voluntarily and illegally engaged in the fight for sport or business, his estate cannot now seek damages for the unfortunate but foreseeable outcome of that illegal conduct.
Dissenting - Holcomb, J.
No. A person's consent to an illegal act should not bar a civil action for injuries, because one cannot legally consent to a breach of the peace. The dissent argues that the majority ignores the state's paramount interest in protecting its citizens and maintaining public order, which cannot be waived by individual consent. Citing Judge Cooley, the dissent reasons that because prize fighting is a crime, the consent is legally void. Therefore, the injured party (or their estate) should be able to recover damages, as the state does not recognize the validity of an agreement to commit an unlawful assault.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant precedent in Washington tort law by adopting a minority position on the effect of consent to an illegal act. By prioritizing the principles of assumption of risk and barring recovery for one's own illegal conduct, the court narrowed the circumstances under which a participant in mutual combat can sue. This ruling forces future plaintiffs in similar cases to plead and prove aggravating factors, such as excessive force or malicious intent, to overcome the defense of consent. It separates the state's interest in criminal prosecution from the civil liabilities between the consenting participants.
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