Harrod v. State
1985 Md. App. LEXIS 529, 65 Md. App. 128, 499 A.2d 959 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
A conviction for assault requires either a specific intent to commit a battery against the victim or that the victim be placed in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to a charge of attempted-battery assault where the unintended victim suffers no actual harm.
Facts:
- John G. Harrod's wife, Cheryl Harrod, was at their home with her friend, Calvin Crigger.
- John Harrod emerged from a bedroom, swinging a hammer and confronting Cheryl and Calvin.
- As Calvin fled the house, Harrod threw the hammer in his direction.
- The hammer missed Calvin and struck the wall above the portable crib where Harrod's infant son, James Christopher Harrod, was located.
- Christopher was not physically injured by the hammer and there was no evidence that he was aware of the event.
- Harrod then retrieved a hunting knife, threatened Cheryl, and chased Calvin out of the house.
Procedural Posture:
- John G. Harrod was charged in the Circuit Court for Carroll County with two counts of assault (one against his wife, Cheryl, and one against his son, Christopher) and two counts of carrying a deadly weapon.
- Following a bench trial, the trial court found Harrod guilty on all four counts.
- Harrod, as the appellant, appealed the convictions to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
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Issue:
Is the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for assault on a victim who was neither physically harmed by the defendant's act nor aware of it?
Opinions:
Majority - Alpert, J.
No. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for assault because neither form of criminal assault was proven. The common law recognizes two types of assault: (1) an attempted battery and (2) an act that places another in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. For an attempted-battery assault, the prosecution must prove the defendant had a specific intent to injure the victim. Here, the evidence shows Harrod's intent was directed at Calvin, not his son Christopher. The doctrine of transferred intent cannot apply because it requires the unintended victim to actually be harmed, which Christopher was not. For the second type of assault, placing the victim in fear, the victim must be aware of the impending battery. As an infant in a crib, there was no evidence Christopher was aware of the hammer being thrown, so he could not have been placed in apprehension of harm.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the distinct elements of the two forms of common law assault in Maryland and establishes a significant limitation on the doctrine of transferred intent. By holding that transferred intent does not apply in an attempted battery case unless the unintended victim is actually harmed, the court prevents the doctrine's expansion to scenarios involving near misses. This decision reinforces the specific intent requirement for attempt crimes and protects defendants from being convicted of multiple assaults for a single act that endangered, but did not injure, multiple people.
