Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education
1983 Md. LEXIS 212, 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
The Maryland Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the common law doctrine of contributory negligence will be maintained, holding that its abrogation in favor of comparative negligence is a fundamental public policy decision reserved for the legislature, not the judiciary.
Facts:
- On April 26, 1978, Michael Harrison, a fourteen-year-old eighth-grade student, attended a required physical education class held in the school gymnasium due to inclement weather.
- The class involved approximately sixty-three children participating in a "free exercise" day, during which students were allowed to use various athletic equipment.
- Along with several other students, Michael practiced tumbling maneuvers on a crash pad located at the end of a wrestling mat.
- On the last of several attempts to complete a running front flip, Michael lost control and landed on his neck and shoulders.
- As a result of his injuries, Michael became a quadriplegic, requiring constant supervision and attention.
Procedural Posture:
- Michael Harrison's mother, for herself and on Michael's behalf, filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (trial court) against the Montgomery County Board of Education and three gym teachers.
- At the ensuing jury trial, the defendants relied, in part, upon the doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete defense.
- The plaintiffs sought jury instructions that the doctrine of comparative negligence should be applied, proposing three different forms of comparative negligence (pure, and two modified forms).
- The trial judge rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed comparative negligence instructions and instead instructed the jury, in accordance with established Maryland law, that if Michael was contributorily negligent, it would be a complete bar to his claim.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants.
- The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland (highest court) granted certiorari prior to a decision by the intermediate appellate court to consider the issue.
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Issue:
Should the common law doctrine of contributory negligence be judicially abrogated in Maryland and the doctrine of comparative negligence adopted in its place as the rule governing trial of negligence actions?
Opinions:
Majority - Murphy, C.J.
No, the common law doctrine of contributory negligence should not be judicially abrogated in Maryland. The Court found that contributory negligence is a fundamental principle deeply embedded in Maryland's common law, consistently applied for 135 years, and Maryland cases do not reflect a general dissatisfaction or a pressing societal need to abandon it. While acknowledging that the Court can modify common law, it emphasized the doctrine of stare decisis, which favors legislative action for changes in long-established rules that reflect public policy. The Court noted that the Maryland General Assembly had considered and rejected twenty-one bills to replace contributory negligence with comparative fault between 1966 and 1982, indicating an intention to retain the existing doctrine. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that choosing between various forms of comparative negligence (pure or modified) involves major policy considerations with far-reaching implications in tort law, making it a decision more appropriately addressed by the legislative branch.
Dissenting - Davidson, J.
Yes, the common law doctrine of contributory negligence should be judicially abrogated and replaced by comparative negligence. Justice Davidson argued that contributory negligence has become unsound in modern life, being an unfair and arbitrary "all or nothing" rule that has been overwhelmingly rejected by virtually every common law and civil law nation, including 39 U.S. states (8 by judicial decision). The dissent asserted that the massive erosion of the doctrine demonstrates a compelling societal dissatisfaction and a basic attitudinal change in society's concept of fairness. Davidson, J., rejected the majority's reliance on legislative inaction, stating that it is a "weak reed" for inferring legislative intent, as lawmakers might have intended for the judiciary to resolve complex collateral issues on a case-by-case basis. The dissent emphasized that since contributory negligence was a court-created doctrine, courts have the authority and the imperative duty to repair injustice and reform the law to be responsive to societal demands, especially when legislative inaction creates a stalemate.
Analysis:
This case is highly significant for illustrating the Maryland Court of Appeals' strong adherence to judicial restraint and stare decisis in the face of widespread national and international legal trends. It highlights the jurisprudential tension between the judiciary's role in evolving common law and its deference to the legislative branch on matters of broad public policy, particularly where legislative inaction is interpreted as an affirmation of existing law. The decision positioned Maryland as one of a dwindling minority of states retaining contributory negligence, reinforcing the principle that fundamental changes to deeply entrenched common law, especially those with wide systemic impacts and alternative policy formulations, are considered legislative prerogatives in Maryland.
