Harris v. United States
390 U.S. 234 (1968)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Evidence of a crime discovered in plain view is not the product of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment if the officer who sees it is lawfully in the position from which the evidence is viewed for a non-investigatory, caretaking purpose.
Facts:
- The petitioner's automobile was seen leaving the site of a robbery.
- Police traced the car and arrested the petitioner as he was entering it near his home.
- After the arrest, police decided to impound the car as evidence and had it towed to the police precinct.
- At the precinct lot, the car's windows were open and its doors were unlocked while it began to rain.
- Pursuant to a regulation, an officer went to the car to perform the caretaking tasks of rolling up the windows and locking the doors.
- To secure the passenger-side window, the officer opened the passenger door.
- Upon opening the door, the officer saw the robbery victim's vehicle registration card lying face up on the metal door stripping.
Procedural Posture:
- The petitioner was charged with robbery and tried in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
- At trial, petitioner's motion to suppress the registration card as evidence was denied.
- The petitioner was convicted by the trial court.
- The petitioner, as appellant, appealed his conviction to a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed the conviction.
- The Government, as appellee, successfully petitioned for a rehearing en banc.
- The full Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed the petitioner's trial court conviction.
- The petitioner sought and was granted a writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an officer's discovery of incriminating evidence, which is in plain view while the officer is taking routine, non-investigatory measures to secure an impounded vehicle, constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The discovery of the registration card did not result from an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that the officer's actions were not a search for evidence, but rather a measure taken to protect the impounded vehicle from the elements while it was in police custody. Because the officer had a lawful reason to open the car door as part of this protective, non-investigatory duty, he had a right to be in the position to view the registration card. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who is lawfully in a position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced as evidence.
Concurring - Justice Douglas
No. The discovery of the evidence was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. The concurrence emphasized that this case is distinct from precedent like Preston v. United States because two conditions were met: 1) the car was lawfully in police custody, and the police were responsible for protecting it; and 2) the officers came across the incriminating evidence while performing this duty to protect the car, not while engaged in an inventory or other search of the vehicle for evidence.
Analysis:
This case refines the application of the plain view doctrine by extending it to situations involving the police's 'community caretaking' function. The decision establishes that a police officer's non-investigatory actions to secure property lawfully in their custody do not constitute a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes. This creates a clear distinction between actions taken to find evidence and actions taken for routine, protective reasons, allowing evidence found inadvertently during the latter to be admissible. This principle supports the later development of the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement.
