Harris v. State
728 A.2d 180 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
The Maryland crime of carjacking is a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime. Therefore, voluntary intoxication is not a valid defense to negate the requisite criminal intent for carjacking.
Facts:
- Timothy Harris, Jack Tipton, and several friends were playing cards and drinking alcohol at a friend's house.
- Tipton offered to drive Harris home in his car.
- During the drive, Harris became angry when Tipton refused his request to go to the District of Columbia.
- Harris forcibly removed Tipton from the driver's seat of the car.
- Harris then drove away in Tipton's car.
- Harris later claimed that due to consuming alcohol and smoking marijuana, he had "blacked out" and could not remember the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- Timothy Harris was indicted by the Grand Jury for Prince George’s County for carjacking, unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, and second-degree assault.
- At trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Harris raised the defense of voluntary intoxication.
- The trial judge refused to provide a jury instruction that voluntary intoxication could be a defense to the carjacking charge, ruling that carjacking is a general intent crime.
- The jury found Harris guilty of carjacking and assault, but not guilty of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
- Harris filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, the state's intermediate appellate court.
- Before the intermediate court could hear the case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the state's highest court, granted certiorari on its own motion to hear the appeal directly.
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Issue:
Is the crime of carjacking, as defined by Maryland Code Article 27 § 348A, a specific intent crime for which voluntary intoxication can serve as a defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Raker, J.
No, the crime of carjacking is not a specific intent crime. The plain language of the carjacking statute, its legislative history, and its purpose all indicate that the legislature intended to create a general intent offense. The statute defines the offense as obtaining unauthorized control of a vehicle by force without reference to any further act or future consequence. Unlike statutes for specific intent crimes, it conspicuously lacks phrases such as 'with intent to.' Furthermore, the statute's provision that an intent to 'permanently deprive' is not a defense, without substituting a different specific intent, reinforces that only a general intent to commit the proscribed act is required. The legislature's goal was to create a new offense with enhanced penalties to make it easier to prosecute this dangerous conduct, not to add the higher burden of proving a specific intent beyond the immediate act of taking the vehicle by force.
Dissenting - Bell, C.J.
Yes, carjacking should be considered a specific intent crime. Carjacking is essentially an aggravated form of robbery, which is a specific intent crime in Maryland. The statute's provision that lack of intent to 'permanently' deprive the owner is not a defense implies that a specific intent to at least 'temporarily' deprive the owner is still a required element; otherwise, the word 'permanently' is superfluous. Given this ambiguity, the Rule of Lenity should apply, favoring the defendant. It is an anomalous and illogical result for a lesser crime like unauthorized use of a vehicle to require specific intent while the more serious and heavily penalized crime of carjacking requires only general intent.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the mens rea (mental state) required for the crime of carjacking in Maryland, classifying it as a general intent crime. By doing so, the court makes it significantly easier for prosecutors to secure convictions, as they do not need to prove the defendant had a further, more remote purpose in mind beyond the act of taking the car by force. This ruling also strictly limits the availability of the voluntary intoxication defense for defendants charged with carjacking, reflecting a policy choice to hold intoxicated offenders accountable for this particularly violent offense.
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