Harris v. New York
401 U.S. 222 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor may use a defendant's voluntary statements that were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona to impeach the defendant's credibility, provided the statements are not used as evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
Facts:
- Vester Harris was charged with selling heroin to an undercover police officer on two separate occasions, January 4 and January 6.
- Harris was arrested on January 7.
- Following his arrest, police interrogated Harris without providing the full Miranda warnings, specifically failing to inform him of his right to appointed counsel.
- During this interrogation, Harris made statements that partially contradicted the version of events he would later present at trial.
- At his trial, Harris took the stand in his own defense.
- He denied the sale on January 4 and admitted to a transaction on January 6, but claimed he sold baking powder, not heroin, as part of a scheme to defraud the buyer.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of New York charged Vester Harris in a state trial court with two counts of selling heroin.
- At the jury trial, the prosecution conceded that Harris's post-arrest statements were inadmissible in its case-in-chief under Miranda.
- The prosecution used the statements during cross-examination to impeach Harris's testimony, and the trial judge instructed the jury to consider them only for credibility purposes.
- The jury found Harris guilty on the second count.
- Harris appealed, and the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted in Miranda v. Arizona, bar the prosecution from using a defendant's voluntary pre-arrest statements, made without full Miranda warnings, to impeach the defendant's credibility on cross-examination?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
No. Statements that are inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief due to a Miranda violation may still be used to impeach a defendant's credibility if they take the stand and testify inconsistently. The Court reasoned that the privilege for a defendant to testify in their own defense cannot be construed as a right to commit perjury. Extending the Miranda exclusionary rule to bar impeachment would pervert the rule into a shield for perjury, allowing a defendant to make false statements without fear of being confronted with their own prior inconsistent utterances. Relying on Walder v. United States, which allowed illegally seized physical evidence to be used for impeachment, the Court found no principled difference that would bar the use of trustworthy but unwarned statements for the same purpose. The Court concluded that sufficient deterrence for police misconduct flows from making the evidence unavailable in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. The Constitution denies the State the use of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda for any purpose, including impeaching the defendant's credibility. The majority misapplied Walder, which involved impeachment on a collateral matter, whereas Harris was impeached on matters directly related to the charged crime. The Court's holding 'fetters' a defendant's Fifth Amendment choice to testify by making its assertion costly, as they risk being impeached with an illegally obtained statement. This forces a defendant into a difficult choice between remaining silent and testifying, undermining the 'unfettered' exercise of their constitutional will. The dissent warns that this ruling will encourage police to disregard Miranda, knowing that any statement they obtain can still be used if the defendant dares to testify.
Analysis:
Harris v. New York established the significant 'impeachment exception' to the Miranda exclusionary rule. This decision limits the scope of Miranda's protection, clarifying that the rule is not an absolute bar to all uses of an unwarned statement. It reflects a balancing act between deterring police misconduct and the judiciary's interest in preventing perjury and ensuring the integrity of the truth-finding process at trial. The ruling has a profound impact on trial strategy, forcing defendants to weigh the benefits of testifying against the risk that prior, otherwise inadmissible statements could be used to attack their credibility before the jury.
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