Harris v. Jones
281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
To establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct was intentional or reckless, extreme and outrageous, causally connected to the plaintiff's emotional distress, and that the emotional distress was severe. The tort is now formally recognized in this jurisdiction.
Facts:
- William R. Harris, an employee at General Motors Corporation (GM), had a lifelong speech impediment that caused him to stutter.
- Harris's supervisor, H. Robert Jones, was aware of Harris's stutter and his sensitivity to it.
- Over a five-month period in 1975, Jones verbally and physically mimicked Harris's stutter more than 30 times at work.
- When Harris requested a transfer, Jones refused, called him a 'troublemaker,' and again mimicked his speech.
- Harris had a pre-existing nervous condition for which he had been under a physician's care for six years prior to Jones's conduct.
- As a result of Jones's actions, Harris felt 'shaken up' and humiliated, his nervousness was heightened, and his speech impediment worsened.
- Harris's wife testified that his nervous condition got worse during this period, but also noted that Harris had pre-existing marital problems and a tendency to drink excessively.
Procedural Posture:
- William R. Harris sued H. Robert Jones and General Motors Corporation in the Superior Court of Baltimore City (a trial court).
- The trial court denied the defendants' motions for directed verdicts.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Harris, awarding him compensatory and punitive damages.
- Jones and GM, as appellants, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (an intermediate appellate court).
- The Court of Special Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, finding the evidence of causation and severe distress to be legally insufficient.
- The Court of Appeals of Maryland (the state's highest court) granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Special Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a supervisor's conduct of repeatedly and maliciously mimicking an employee's speech impediment, which aggravates the employee's pre-existing nervous condition, constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when the evidence fails to show that the resulting emotional distress was severe?
Opinions:
Majority - Murphy, C. J.
No. While the court formally recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Harris's emotional distress was severe. The court adopted the four-element test from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46: (1) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe. Although Jones's conduct was intentional, the court found it unnecessary to decide if it was extreme and outrageous because Harris failed to prove the fourth element. The court defined 'severe' distress as distress 'so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.' Harris's evidence—that he was 'shaken up,' humiliated, and that his pre-existing nervous condition and speech impediment worsened—was deemed 'vague and weak.' It was not supported by sufficient particulars to demonstrate the intensity or duration required to meet the high standard of severe emotional distress.
Analysis:
This case is significant for formally establishing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) in Maryland. By adopting the stringent four-part test from the Restatement, the court set a high bar for recovery. The decision emphasizes that liability is reserved for only the most egregious conduct causing truly debilitating emotional harm, not for 'mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.' This ruling provides a clear framework for future IIED claims in the state but also signals that succeeding on such a claim, particularly in proving the 'severity' of distress, will be very difficult for plaintiffs.
