Harris v. Groth
1983 Wash. LEXIS 1488, 99 Wash. 2d 438, 663 P.2d 113 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
Under Washington law, the standard of care for a health care provider is that of a reasonably prudent practitioner acting under similar circumstances, not merely the standard customarily practiced by the profession. Additionally, a non-physician expert is not per se disqualified from testifying on medical issues in a malpractice case if the trial court finds them otherwise qualified.
Facts:
- Barbara Harris, who had a history of the eye disease iritis, sought treatment from Dr. Robert Groth in November 1976.
- Dr. Groth prescribed systemic corticosteroids, a medication known to sometimes induce glaucoma in susceptible patients.
- Between January and March 1977, Harris began experiencing symptoms consistent with glaucoma, including flashing lights and pressure in her eye, and reported these to Dr. Groth during several visits.
- At no time between November 1976 and mid-March 1977 did Dr. Groth perform a test of Harris's intraocular pressure.
- Warren's Drugs, a pharmacy owned by co-defendant Warren Lindblad, mistakenly provided Harris with Isopto-Carpine, a pupil-constricting drug, instead of the prescribed pupil-dilating drug, atropine.
- On March 18, 1977, Harris made an emergency visit to one of Dr. Groth's associates, who tested her eye pressure, found it to be extremely high, and diagnosed her with an acute glaucoma attack.
- Harris required emergency eye surgery and subsequently suffered a severe deterioration in her vision.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Harris sued Dr. Robert Groth for medical malpractice and Warren Lindblad for negligence in a Washington state trial court.
- At the close of trial, the court ruled that pharmacist Lindblad was negligent as a matter of law but declined to do the same for Dr. Groth.
- The trial court refused to give Harris's proposed jury instruction based on a 'reasonable prudence' standard, instead giving an instruction based on 'established medical practice.'
- The court also limited the expert testimony of Professor Fredric Harris, a non-physician physiologist, ruling that some topics were outside his expertise.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Groth.
- Harris, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division One.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Groth, the appellee.
- Harris petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review, which the court granted on two specific issues.
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Issue:
Does Washington law, specifically RCW 7.70.040(1), require a health care provider's conduct to be measured against a standard of reasonable prudence, rather than solely by the customary practices of the medical profession?
Opinions:
Majority - Utter, J.
Yes, Washington law requires a health care provider's conduct to be measured against a standard of reasonable prudence. The court interpreted RCW 7.70.040(1), which requires a provider to exercise the care 'expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider,' as establishing a standard beyond mere compliance with professional custom. The legislature's deliberate choice of the words 'reasonably prudent' over the pre-existing 'average practitioner' standard indicated an intent to codify the principles of Helling v. Carey, not to overrule it. Therefore, what is customarily practiced is merely evidence of what is prudent, but it is not dispositive. The court also held that non-physicians are not automatically disqualified from giving expert testimony if they are otherwise qualified by knowledge, skill, or experience. Despite agreeing with Harris on these legal principles, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment because Harris's proposed jury instruction on reasonable prudence was improperly framed—it was overly broad and failed to state the law correctly—and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the testimony of her non-physician expert.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'reasonably prudent practitioner' standard in Washington medical malpractice law, confirming that the state legislature did not fully abrogate the landmark Helling v. Carey decision. By establishing that professional custom is not the definitive measure of due care, the ruling empowers juries to find negligence even when a defendant doctor adheres to common industry practices. This shifts the focus from what is 'done' to what 'should be done' under a standard of reasonable prudence, potentially increasing the scope of liability for healthcare providers. The holding on expert witnesses also liberalizes evidence rules, allowing plaintiffs more flexibility in proving their cases by using qualified experts who may not be licensed physicians.
