Yes. You can sue for both things at once. The old legal rules were very picky and would have made you file two separate lawsuits because false imprisonment and slander were considered different 'types' of cases. But the modern law got rid of those complicated rules. The new rule is much simpler: if all the bad things happened as part of the same event or 'transaction,' you can combine them all into one lawsuit to get everything sorted out at once.

Yes, it's okay to combine these complaints in one lawsuit. I think this because both the jailing and the bad-mouthing happened as part of the same event. Our new rules allow this to avoid having multiple separate trials about the same incident. This is different from the old rules, which were more strict about keeping different types of complaints separate. We're trying to make things simpler and faster in court. Even though being jailed hurts someone physically and being spoken badly about hurts their reputation, it makes sense to deal with both issues together when they're part of the same incident. Some earlier court decisions might have disagreed, but more recent ones support our view. This approach helps us solve all parts of a problem in one go, which is more efficient.

<opinion type="majority">

By the Court,

<author id="AKn">Valentine J.</author>
This action was brought in the court below by Avery,, as plaintiff. The petition states two causes of action— false imprisonment and slander — and alleges that both arose out of the same transaction. Harris demurred to this petition, on the ground “that it appears on the face of the petition, that several causes of action are improperly joined.” The district court overruled the demurrer, and this ruling is assigned as error.
The petition shows that the two causes of action are founded upon the following facts. Harris met Avery in the city of Fort Scott, and in the presence of several other persons called Avery a thief; said he had a stolen horse; took the horse from Avery, and kept the horse four or five days; arrested Avery and confined him in the county jail with felons four or five days.
"We think these facts as detailed in the petition constitute only one transaction, [Brewer v. Temple, 15 Howard Pr. R., 286;] and whether they constitute more than one cause of action, under our code practice, may be questionable. Under the authority we have referred to they would not. But as we have not been asked to decide the latter question, we will pass it over and treat the case as though the fqcts stated constitute two causes of action.
<page-number citation-index="1" label="149">*149</page-number>Section 89 of the code [Comp. Laws 138,] provides “that the plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same petition, whether they be such as have hertofore been denominated legal or equitable, or both, when they are included in either one of the following classes: First, the same transaction' of transactions connected with the same subject of action.”
This differs in many respects from the common law rule. At common law “where the same form of action may be adopted for several-distinct injuries, the plaintiff may, in general, proceed for all in one action, though the several rights effected were derived from different titles,” [1 Chitty’s Pl., 201; Tidd’s Pr., 11,] and different forms of action may be united “where the same plea may be pleaded and the same judgment given on all the counts of the declaration, or whenever the counts are of the same nature, and the same judgment is to be given on them although the pleas be different.” 1 Chitty’s Pl., 200.
In the action at bar, if Harris had arrested Avery on a warrant, which Harris had-' -maliciously and without probable cause obtained from a court of competent jurisdiction, and had also converted the horse to his own use, then at common law, Avery would have had three distinct causes of action, which fie could unite in one suit— first, an action for the false imprisonment or malicious prosecution; second, an action of slander for the words spoken, and third, an action of trover for the conversion of the horse. These may all be united in an action on the case [1 Chitty’s Pl., 133, 134, 146; 1 Tidd’s Pr., 5;] trover being a species of case. Avery might, also, at common law, unite with these causes’ of action as many other causes of action as he might have, for malicious prosecution, slander, trover, criminal conversation, nuisance, <page-number citation-index="1" label="150">*150</page-number>and other causes of action which may be sued in an action on the case, and although they each may have arisen out of a different transaction, and at a different time, and in a different place.
But if Harris arrested Avery without any process— which was the fact in this case — and in an entirely irregular manner, then the two causes of' action for false imprisonment and slander could not at common law be united, as the first would have to be sued in an action of trespass and the second in an action on the case, and it would make no difference whether they both arose out of the same transaction or not.
Our code has abolished all the common law forms of action, and has established a system for the joinder of actions, — more philosophical, and complete within itself. It follows the rules of equity more closely than it does those of the common law, one object seeming to be to avoid the multiplicity of suits, and to settle in one action, as equity did, as far-as practicable, the whole subject matter of a controversy. Hence the common law ,on this question is no criterion. It is probably true that the two causes of action for false imprisonment and slander cannot, under our code, be united, unless both arise out of the same transaction, one being an injury to the person and the other being an injury to the character; but we do not know of any reason why they should not be united when both do arise out of the same transaction.
It is claimed by counsel for plaintiff in error that th earlier reports of the New York code are against this view of the case. He refers to 8 Howard’s Pr. B., 59, 78; 9 Howard’s Pr. B., 113; 1 Duer, 629. ¥e think it questionable whether these cases sustain the counsel’s views; but if they do, the later decisions under the same <page-number citation-index="1" label="151">*151</page-number>code are squarely against him. [See Brewer v. Temple, 15 Howard’s Pr. R., 286; Robinson v. Flint, 16 Howard’s Pr. R., 240.] In the latter case the court, as we think, expresses the true rule. They say “that the plaintiff may unite, first, as many legal causes of action as he pleases arising out of the same transaction; second, as many equitable causes of action as he pleases arising out of the same transaction; third, as many legal and equitable causes of action as he pleases arising out of the same transaction; fourth, as many causes of action as he pleases arising out of different transactions connected with the subject of the action.”
The order of the district court overruling the demurer to the petition is affirmed.
<judges id="b149-7">All the justices concurring.</judges>
</opinion>

Yes. A plaintiff may unite claims for false imprisonment and slander in the same petition if they both arise from the same transaction. The modern code of civil procedure has abolished the common law's rigid 'forms of action,' which would have required separate lawsuits for trespass (false imprisonment) and action on the case (slander). The code's new system, which is more aligned with the principles of equity, aims to avoid a multiplicity of suits by allowing all controversies stemming from a single transaction to be settled in one action. Because the false imprisonment and slander alleged by Avery occurred as part of a single, continuous series of events, they constitute one 'transaction' and are properly joined in the same petition.

Yes. The joinder of the causes of action for false imprisonment and slander in the same petition is proper under our code. This is because both causes of action arose from the same transaction, aligning with the provisions of our code that allow for such joinder to avoid multiplicity of suits and to settle the whole subject matter of a controversy in one action. I reason that our code has abolished all the common law forms of action and established a more philosophical and complete system for the joinder of actions. This approach follows the rules of equity more closely than those of the common law, aiming to simplify and expedite legal proceedings. While at common law, these two causes of action could not be united if the arrest was made without process (as in this case), our code allows for their joinder when they arise from the same transaction. This is true even though one is an injury to the person and the other is an injury to character. I acknowledge that earlier New York code reports might have been against this view, but later decisions under the same code support our interpretation. The true rule, as expressed in Robinson v. Flint, allows for the union of legal and equitable causes of action arising from the same transaction.

Harris v. Avery

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