Harper v. Robinson
589 S.E.2d 295, 263 Ga. App. 727, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 3196 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
In Georgia, a keeper of a domestic animal is not liable for injuries caused by the animal under theories of strict liability, statutory liability, or premises liability unless the keeper had knowledge of the animal's specific propensity to cause the type of harm that occurred.
Facts:
- Charles Robinson became aware of an animal named Natsayia, which he understood to be a wolf or wolf-hybrid, and acquired her for his brother, Matthew Robinson.
- A few weeks later, Matthew Robinson and Natsayia moved into the home of Philip Harper.
- Harper implemented rules regarding Natsayia, including keeping her separated from his smaller dogs and requiring Matthew to supervise her at all times when she was inside the house.
- These rules were established because Natsayia had previously destroyed property (blinds and carpet) and was large and rambunctious around Harper's smaller dogs.
- Charles and Kristie Robinson were visiting Harper's home with their infant daughter, Cora Le.
- Cora Le was placed on a bed to sleep during the visit.
- While unsupervised, Natsayia picked the infant up in her mouth and carried her to another room, resulting in the child's death.
- There was no evidence that Natsayia had ever previously attacked or bitten a human being.
Procedural Posture:
- Charles W. Robinson and Kristie Robinson filed a wrongful death action against Philip Harper III in a Georgia trial court.
- The complaint asserted claims of negligence, strict liability, liability under OCGA § 51-2-7 (vicious animal statute), and premises liability.
- Harper moved for summary judgment on all claims.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to Harper on the negligence claim but denied it on the claims of strict liability, statutory liability, and premises liability.
- Harper (appellant) appealed the trial court's partial denial of his summary judgment motion to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, with the Robinsons as appellees.
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Issue:
Is a homeowner liable for the death of an infant caused by an animal kept on their property when there is no evidence the animal was legally 'wild' or had previously shown a propensity to harm humans?
Opinions:
Majority - Adams, Judge
No, a homeowner is not liable for the death of an infant caused by an animal kept on their property without evidence that the animal was wild or that the homeowner knew of its propensity to harm humans. First, the strict liability claim fails because Natsayia was not a 'ferae naturae' (wild) animal. Harper presented direct evidence of Natsayia's pedigree as a domestic dog, which the Robinsons' subjective and speculative testimony that she 'looks like a wolf' was insufficient to rebut. Second, liability under the vicious animal statute, OCGA § 51-2-7, requires proof that the animal was dangerous and that the keeper knew of this propensity. There was no evidence Natsayia had ever harmed a human, and knowledge of a dog's tendency to destroy property or dominate other animals does not constitute notice of its propensity to harm people. Finally, the premises liability claim fails because Harper lacked the required superior knowledge of any danger, as there was no evidence of the dog's vicious propensities. Harper's admission of moral responsibility does not create legal liability where none exists.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict requirements for holding an animal keeper liable in Georgia, particularly for injuries caused by domestic animals. It clarifies that a plaintiff must provide concrete evidence, not mere speculation, to challenge an animal's classification as domestic. The court narrowly interprets the 'knowledge' element for statutory liability, holding that an owner's awareness of a dog's rambunctiousness, property destruction, or aggression toward other animals does not establish notice of a propensity to harm humans. This raises the evidentiary bar for plaintiffs in such cases and distinguishes legal liability from moral responsibility.
