Harper, Ron v. City Chicago Heights
223 F.3d 593 (2000)
Rule of Law:
When fashioning a remedy for a Section 2 Voting Rights Act violation, a federal court must defer to the jurisdiction's proposed plan if it provides a full, legally acceptable remedy and must respect state law and local legislative preferences, unless a specific finding demonstrates that state law options violate federal law or are otherwise inadequate to remedy the violation.
Facts:
- In 1987, Ron Harper, Kevin Perkins, William Elliot, and Robert McCoy (the Class) filed a class action against the City of Chicago Heights, alleging its at-large election method for the City Council diluted African-American voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
- In 1988, the Class filed a similar suit against the Chicago Heights Park District, challenging its at-large election method for selecting the Park District Board.
- The district court ultimately found that the original at-large election methods used by both the City and the Park District violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
- A consent decree was approved that abandoned the at-large election method and created a new system for both entities using six single-member districts and an at-large mayor/park board president, modifying statutory forms of government.
- The Seventh Circuit later vacated this consent decree, holding that it improperly overrode state law without proper findings that such a remedy was necessary to rectify a federal law violation.
- Following remand, Chicago Heights voters approved a new form of city government (the 'referendum system') in a referendum, which was identical to the City's plan in the earlier consent decree.
- The Park District passed a resolution adopting a new governance structure (the 'resolution system') identical to its plan in the earlier consent decree.
- Experience under the City's referendum system showed that the at-large elected mayor frequently broke tie votes in the city council by voting with the white aldermen.
- Perkins and McCoy, who had split from the Class, objected to the referendum system, arguing the six-member structure with an at-large mayor's tie-breaking and veto power still negated minority power.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1987, Ron Harper, Kevin Perkins, William Elliot, and Robert McCoy (the Class) filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the City of Chicago Heights.
- In 1988, the Class filed an almost identical suit in the same district court against the Chicago Heights Park District.
- The district court consolidated the claims and certified the Class.
- District Judge Nordberg denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted in part the Class's motion, finding the three 'Gingles' factors satisfied for a Section 2 claim.
- The cases were then reassigned to District Judge Will for trial.
- Judge Will conducted pretrial mediation, resulting in a consent decree that created new governmental systems for the City and Park District with single-member districts and at-large elected officials.
- Kevin Perkins and Robert McCoy (Individual Plaintiffs) appealed from the order entering the consent decree to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Perkins v. City of Chicago Heights, 47 F.3d 212).
- The Seventh Circuit vacated the entire consent decree and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court should not have approved a decree overriding state law without making 'properly supported findings that such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law.'
- By the time the Seventh Circuit's decision was handed down in February 1995, the City’s 1995 general election was approaching; Judge Will ordered the election to proceed but directed the consent decree for the City be submitted for voter approval through a referendum.
- The Park District passed a resolution adopting the new form of governance specified in the decree.
- On November 7, 1995, Chicago Heights held a referendum, and the voters approved the new form of city government (the 'referendum system').
- Judge Will passed away, and the cases, still on remand, were reassigned to District Judge Coar.
- Judge Coar reiterated that the old, at-large election method violated Section 2 and made particularized findings to support this determination.
- Judge Coar then rejected the referendum system for the City, finding it did not remedy the Section 2 violation, and ordered the parties to propose new governmental structures.
- Judge Coar also rejected the resolution system for the Park District, expressing concerns that it did not remedy the Section 2 violation.
- After reviewing proposals, Judge Coar rejected the referendum system for the City again and ordered the establishment of an at-large system using cumulative voting.
- Judge Coar subsequently issued multiple orders awarding attorneys’ fees and expenses to Class Counsel and to Perkins and McCoy’s attorneys.
- The City, the Park District, and the Class appealed Judge Coar's rulings on the remedy and attorneys' fees to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
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Issue:
1. Did the district court err in rejecting the City of Chicago Heights' referendum-approved election system as an inadequate remedy for a Section 2 Voting Rights Act violation? 2. Did the district court err in rejecting the Chicago Heights Park District's resolution-adopted election system as an inadequate remedy for a Section 2 Voting Rights Act violation? 3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a cumulative voting plan as a remedy for the City without first selecting one of Illinois' statutorily authorized methods or finding those methods to violate federal law, and by disregarding the City's preference for single-member districts? 4. Were the individual plaintiffs, Perkins and McCoy, 'prevailing parties' entitled to attorneys' fees, and were the awarded fees reasonable?
Opinions:
Majority - Diane P. Wood
1. No, the district court did not err in rejecting the City's referendum system as an inadequate remedy for a Section 2 Voting Rights Act violation. The court found that the referendum system did not adequately remedy the original Section 2 violation. It was a permissible inference from the evidence that the at-large mayor's pattern of voting in tie-breaking situations, consistently with white aldermen on an even-numbered council, continued the diluting effect of the original at-large system. The court cited the evidence of the mayor’s voting pattern and the likelihood of ties as sufficient to support the district court’s conclusion that the system did not adequately address the acknowledged problem. 2. Yes, the district court did err in rejecting the Chicago Heights Park District's resolution-adopted election system. The court found the absence of evidence of continuing discrimination for the Park District significantly troubling. The Park District presented evidence that its board president regularly voted with a diverse bloc including African-American, Hispanic, and white members, and that capital improvement expenditures in minority districts had substantially increased. Because the burden of proving a Section 2 violation lies with the minority group, and there was a lack of rebuttal evidence to the Park District's claims of remediation, the challenge to its plan was deemed unsuccessful. 3. Yes, the district court abused its discretion by imposing a cumulative voting plan as a remedy for the City. The imposed remedy suffered from the same procedural flaw as the earlier consent decree: it modified Illinois election methods without either going through statutorily required procedures for such changes (like a referendum) or making a judicial finding that existing state options violated federal law and that such changes were necessary to ensure compliance. The Illinois Municipal Code allows cumulative voting, but in a specific form (districts with three aldermen each), which the court's plan altered by calling for a city-wide election of seven council members. The Supreme Court precedent of White v. Weiser holds that courts crafting electoral remedies should follow state policies and preferences whenever adherence does not detract from federal law. The City demonstrated a clear preference for single-member districts through its proposals, and the district court did not find that any use of single-member districts violated federal law. The City should have been given an opportunity to consider the merits and deficiencies of cumulative voting before it was imposed. 4. Yes, Perkins and McCoy were 'prevailing parties' entitled to attorneys' fees for successfully having the ineffectual consent decree vacated by the Seventh Circuit, even if the precise arguments they raised were not the basis for vacating the decree. Their success on a 'significant issue in litigation' materially altered the legal relationship of the parties. However, the district court's fee awards to Perkins and McCoy must be reconsidered. The fees from the Park District must be recalculated due to Perkins and McCoy’s lack of success on the merits regarding the Park District’s remedy. The reasonableness of all awarded fees must be reconsidered because the district court failed to adequately address Perkins and McCoy's reliance on reconstructed time records rather than contemporaneous ones, which can justify a reduction in the fee award. The district court's decision to accept the proposed hourly rates, however, was not an abuse of discretion, as they were supported by attorney affidavits and other evidence of comparable rates.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial guidance on the boundaries of judicial power in fashioning remedies for Voting Rights Act violations. It reinforces the principle that courts must exercise restraint and defer to state and local legislative bodies' preferences and existing state law frameworks, unless those frameworks are themselves found to be non-compliant with federal law or inadequate to cure the violation. The ruling emphasizes the importance of clear findings of fact to support judicial modifications of state election schemes and illustrates the burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate ongoing discrimination under remedial plans. Furthermore, it clarifies that while a 'prevailing party' standard for attorneys' fees is generous, the reasonableness of the fee calculation remains subject to strict scrutiny regarding documentation.
