Harned v. E-Z Finance Co.
1953 Tex. LEXIS 435, 254 S.W.2d 81, 151 Tex. 641 (1953)
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Rule of Law:
Damages cannot be recovered for mental suffering alone, absent a physical injury, injury to property, or an independent, recognized tort. Intentionally causing mental anguish through harassing conduct, without more, does not constitute an actionable tort in Texas.
Facts:
- W.R. Harned had loans with four loan companies and one insurance company (appellees).
- After Harned missed a payment, the companies began collection efforts.
- The companies allegedly made numerous telephone calls each week to Harned's home and workplace.
- Representatives of the companies threatened to take up a collection in the neighborhood to apply to the debt.
- They also threatened to cause Harned to lose his job.
- The companies allegedly called during hours when they knew Harned was sleeping and spoke to his wife in abusive and intimidating language.
- As a result of this conduct, Harned and his wife suffered great mental pain, anguish, and constant fear.
Procedural Posture:
- W.R. Harned sued four loan companies and one insurance company in the County Court at Law of Dallas County for usury penalties and damages for mental anguish.
- The defendant companies filed an exception to Harned's petition, arguing that the allegations of harassment causing mental anguish were insufficient in law to state a cause of action.
- The trial court sustained the defendants' exception and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
- Harned (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the Court of Civil Appeals at El Paso.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.
- While a motion for rehearing was pending, the Court of Civil Appeals certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas asking whether the plaintiff's petition stated a valid cause of action for mental anguish.
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Issue:
Does a creditor's course of willful and harassing conduct in attempting to collect a debt, which causes only mental pain and anguish without any accompanying physical injury or independent tort, give rise to a legally recognized cause of action for damages in Texas?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brewster
No. A creditor's intentional and harassing conduct aimed at collecting a debt that causes only mental anguish does not create an actionable tort in Texas without an accompanying physical injury, injury to property, or other recognized legal wrong. The court affirmed the long-standing Texas rule that damages are not recoverable for mental suffering when there is no other element of actual damages. While acknowledging a trend in other jurisdictions and legal scholarship toward recognizing a new tort for intentional infliction of mental suffering, the court declined to adopt it, stating it could not be the first court in Texas to 'open this hitherto closed door.' The court reasoned that any such change in the common law, which has significant public policy implications, is a matter for the Legislature, not the judiciary. It distinguished prior cases that allowed recovery for mental anguish by noting that those cases involved established torts like assault or false imprisonment, where mental suffering is merely one element of damages. Furthermore, the court held that attempting to collect usurious interest is not a tort in itself, as the Legislature has already provided specific statutory penalties for usury.
Analysis:
This decision firmly established the Texas judiciary's refusal to recognize the independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), placing Texas in opposition to the developing trend in American law, as reflected in the Restatement of Torts. The court's reasoning demonstrates a strong commitment to judicial restraint and deference to the legislature in the creation of new causes of action. By relegating the issue to the Legislature, the decision significantly delayed the availability of a remedy for victims of extreme and outrageous conduct causing severe emotional harm without physical impact. This case is a classic example of a court upholding traditional common law rules against a tide of legal reform, highlighting the tension between judicial precedent and the evolution of tort law to address new forms of injury.
