Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp.
691 F.2d 449 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), a pretrial order may be implicitly amended to include the fault of an unpleaded non-party ('phantom party') if the issue was tried by implied consent, but consent will not be found where the plaintiff lacked adequate notice and a fair opportunity to defend against the non-party's fault.
Facts:
- Darel Hardin, an employee of Combustion Engineering, was injured in an on-the-job accident.
- The injury was allegedly caused by a defectively designed push-pull jack attached to a crane.
- The crane was manufactured by Manitowoc Engineering and leased to Hardin's employer by Lummus Company.
- The push-pull jack was manufactured by defendant Columbus-McKinnon Corp.
- Defendant Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp. allegedly ordered the crane from its parent company and sold it to Lummus Company.
- Hardin sued only Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp. and Columbus-McKinnon Corp. for his injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Darel Hardin filed a products liability suit against Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp. and Columbus-McKinnon Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas.
- Defendants asserted in the pretrial order that the fault of other parties should be compared.
- The district court granted the defendants' motion to compare the fault of all causally responsible parties.
- At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a special verdict allocating percentages of fault among the plaintiff, the two defendants, and three non-parties: Combustion Engineering, Manitowoc Engineering, and Lummus Company.
- The district court entered a judgment against Columbus-McKinnon based on its 13.5% share of the fault and entered judgment for Manitowoc-Forsythe, which was assessed 0% fault.
- Hardin (plaintiff) appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a district court abuse its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) by allowing a jury to compare the fault of non-parties ('phantom parties') who were not identified in the pretrial order, based on a finding of implied consent?
Opinions:
Majority - McKay, J.
Yes, in part. A district court abuses its discretion by submitting a phantom party's fault to the jury where the plaintiff did not have adequate notice and a fair opportunity to defend, but does not abuse its discretion where the record shows the plaintiff was on notice and actively litigated the phantom's fault. The substantive law of Kansas permits the comparison of fault of all causally responsible parties, including non-parties, in a single action. However, in federal court, the procedural introduction of such non-parties is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The key inquiry under Rule 15(b) for trying an unpleaded issue by implied consent is whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and could have presented additional evidence had they received earlier notice. With respect to Manitowoc Engineering, the plaintiff was on notice of its potential fault through pre-trial discovery and himself introduced evidence regarding its liability at trial, thus consenting to the issue. Conversely, with respect to Lummus Company, there was insufficient evidence of its fault, the evidence that was presented was also relevant to other issues already in the case, and the plaintiff was given no indication that Lummus's fault would be an issue, thereby denying him a fair opportunity to defend.
Analysis:
This case highlights the critical intersection of state substantive comparative fault law and federal procedural rules concerning notice and pleading. It establishes that while a state's law may allow defendants to reduce their liability by blaming non-parties, federal procedural fairness under Rule 15(b) requires that the plaintiff have adequate notice of which non-parties will be at issue. The decision serves as a warning to defendants that they cannot 'sandbag' a plaintiff by waiting until the end of trial to identify phantom parties. The case reinforces that a finding of 'implied consent' is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires more than just incidental evidence in the record; the record must show the opposing party understood a new issue was being tried and had a fair chance to meet it.
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