Harbie v. Falk
2005 WL 1560271, 907 So. 2d 566 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
When a will contains a latent ambiguity, which arises when the will's language is applied to external facts, extrinsic or parol evidence is admissible to ascertain and give effect to the testator's intent.
Facts:
- In 1994, Youssef Harbie executed a will.
- At the time, Youssef had a twenty-year-old son, Carlos Harbie, from a previous marriage who lived in Venezuela.
- He also had a two-year-old daughter, Rita Harbie, from his current marriage.
- Youssef's will directed that one half of his residuary estate be distributed 'equally among my children as survive me.'
- The same article of the will also contained the statement: 'I have only one child at the time of this Will, Rita Harbie.'
- The will did not mention Carlos Harbie by name.
- In 2002, Youssef Harbie died.
- Carlos Harbie filed a claim against the estate, asserting that as one of Youssef's children, he was a beneficiary under the will.
Procedural Posture:
- Carlos Harbie made a claim to share in the estate of his deceased father, Youssef Harbie.
- The estate, through its administrator, filed a motion for summary judgment in the Florida trial court, arguing Carlos was not a beneficiary.
- The trial court granted the estate's motion for summary judgment.
- Carlos Harbie, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
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Issue:
Does a will that bequeaths property to 'my children' but also contains a factually incorrect statement that 'I have only one child' create a latent ambiguity that permits a court to consider extrinsic evidence, such as the drafting attorney's testimony, to determine the testator's intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Cope, C.J.
Yes. The will contains a latent ambiguity, and therefore extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the testator's intent. The will's provision for 'my children' directly conflicts with its declaration that the testator has 'only one child' when applied to the external fact that he had two children. This contradiction creates a latent ambiguity, not apparent from the face of the document alone. Under Florida law, where such an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is admissible to clarify the testator's true intent. The court distinguished 'In re Estate of Rice,' where extrinsic evidence was inadmissible because no ambiguity existed. Here, the affidavit of the attorney who drafted the will was properly considered. The affidavit resolved the ambiguity by explaining that Youssef never mentioned Carlos and that the plural term 'children' was included at the attorney's suggestion solely to provide for any potential after-born children, not to include Carlos.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the application of the latent ambiguity doctrine in will interpretation. It clarifies that a factual error within the will itself, when revealed by extrinsic facts, can open the door to evidence outside the document's four corners. The decision underscores the significance of the drafting attorney's testimony in resolving such ambiguities, giving substantial weight to evidence of the testator's expressed intentions during the will's preparation. This holding serves as a practical warning to estate planners about the importance of factual accuracy in testamentary documents, as inaccuracies can lead to litigation where the testator's intent must be proven through extrinsic evidence.
