Hankins v. Mathews
221 Tenn. 190, 25 McCanless 190, 425 S.W.2d 608 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
A provision in a will that grants a fee simple absolute estate but imposes a total restriction on the devisee's ability to sell, mortgage, or encumber the property, even for a limited time, is void as an unlawful restraint on alienation because it is repugnant to the inherent incidents of a fee simple estate and contrary to public policy.
Facts:
- A. A. Hankins died testate on January 31, 1952, leaving a will.
- A. A. Hankins' will bequeathed all personal property and real estate to his wife, Sarah Elizabeth Hankins, for her natural life.
- Upon Sarah Elizabeth Hankins' death, A. A. Hankins' will directed that certain personal property and two tracts of real estate (a 25-acre tract and a 30-acre tract) would go to his nephew, Jim Grubb.
- A. A. Hankins' will included a restriction stating that Jim Grubb was to keep the property in his possession for ten years before he could sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber or dispose of it, and if he attempted to do so, the land would revert to the heirs at law of A. A. Hankins.
- The 25-acre tract of land was acquired by A. A. Hankins and Sarah Elizabeth Hankins as tenants in common, while the 30-acre tract was owned outright by A. A. Hankins.
- Sarah Elizabeth Hankins' will bequeathed all her property, including her interest as a tenant in common in the 25-acre tract, to James A. Grubb (Jim Grubb).
- After Sarah Elizabeth Hankins' death, and within the ten-year restriction period specified in A. A. Hankins' will, Jim Grubb executed deeds and leases transferring the property in question to the defendants.
Procedural Posture:
- James A. Hankins, et al. (complainants) filed an original bill in the Chancery Court of Knox County, alleging that property transferred by Jim Grubb should revert to them due to a violation of A. A. Hankins' will.
- Virgil Mathews, et al. (defendants) demurred to the original bill, arguing that the restriction on alienation in the will was void.
- The Chancellor overruled the defendants' demurrer.
- The Chancellor granted the defendants a discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Does a provision in a will that grants a fee simple absolute estate but prohibits the devisee from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering the property for a period of ten years constitute a valid and enforceable restraint on alienation, or is it void as repugnant to the fee simple estate?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Buenett
No, a provision in a will that grants a fee simple absolute estate but prohibits the devisee from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering the property for a period of ten years is void as an unlawful restraint on alienation. The Court agreed with the defendants that a testator, having granted a fee simple absolute estate, cannot subsequently remove essential incidents of ownership such as the right to sell, mortgage, or encumber the property. Such a restriction, even if for a limited period, is repugnant to the nature of a fee simple estate and is thus void. The power of alienation is an inherent incident of every estate in fee, and any condition completely preventing it is considered void. The Court distinguished this case from those involving partial restraints on alienation (e.g., prohibiting sale to specific persons), emphasizing that a total restriction, even for a limited time, is invalid. It clarified that previous statements in Tennessee law, particularly in Fowlkes v. Wagoner, did not establish that reasonable time-limited restraints on alienation are valid for fee simple estates. Citing Keeling v. Keeling, the Court reiterated that "conditions subsequent preventing alienation of an estate in fee, even for a limited time, are universally held void as inconsistent with the incidents and nature of the estate devised and contrary to public policy." Therefore, the demurrer should be sustained, and the case dismissed.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the long-standing common law principle against restraints on alienation in real property law, especially concerning fee simple estates. It provides a clear ruling that even a time-limited total restriction on alienation is void as repugnant to the inherent nature of a fee simple, thereby preventing potential confusion with more permissible partial restraints. The decision underscores the importance of a clear and unencumbered right of disposition for fee simple owners, reflecting a strong public policy favoring the free marketability and transferability of land. This ruling is crucial for testators and legal professionals drafting wills, as it mandates that attempts to control property indefinitely after granting a full ownership interest will generally be legally invalid.
