Hampton v. United States
425 U.S. 484 (1976)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant's predisposition to commit a crime precludes the use of the entrapment defense and also forecloses a defense based on an alleged violation of the Due Process Clause, even when the government supplies the contraband that is the subject of the criminal charge.
Facts:
- Hampton was a regular at a bar where he played pool with Hutton, who was a confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
- According to government witnesses, Hampton told Hutton he needed money and knew where to obtain heroin, prompting Hutton to arrange a sale with undercover DEA agents.
- Hampton met with two undercover DEA agents and sold them a tinfoil packet of heroin for $145.
- During the first sale, Hampton told the agents he could obtain larger quantities and provided a phone number.
- The next day, one of the agents called Hampton to arrange another purchase.
- Hampton met the agents again and produced a second tinfoil packet of heroin, at which point he was arrested.
- Hampton claimed he believed he was selling a counterfeit, non-narcotic substance supplied by Hutton as part of a scheme to dupe buyers.
- On appeal, Hampton's counsel conceded that Hampton was predisposed to commit the offense.
Procedural Posture:
- Hampton was charged with two counts of distributing heroin in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
- At trial, Hampton requested a jury instruction that if the jury found the government had supplied the narcotics, they must acquit him, regardless of his predisposition.
- The trial court refused to give the requested instruction.
- The jury found Hampton guilty on both counts.
- Hampton, as appellant, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding it was controlled by United States v. Russell.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the conviction of a predisposed defendant for selling contraband that was supplied to him by a government informant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rehnquist
No. The conviction of a predisposed defendant for selling contraband supplied by a government informant does not violate the Due Process Clause. The defense of entrapment focuses exclusively on the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime, not on the conduct of government agents. Because Hampton's predisposition was conceded, the entrapment defense is unavailable to him. The remedy for a defendant who encourages the acts of government agents lies solely in the defense of entrapment. The Court's holding in United States v. Russell, which involved the government supplying a legal but essential ingredient, is not meaningfully different from this case where the government supplied the illegal contraband itself; the difference is one of degree, not of kind. The government's conduct did not violate any protected right of the defendant.
Concurring - Justice Powell
No. While the government's conduct in this specific case does not violate due process, the plurality goes too far in establishing an absolute rule. This case is controlled by United States v. Russell, and the distinction between supplying contraband versus a key ingredient is insignificant. However, I disagree with the plurality's conclusion that a predisposed defendant could never, under any circumstances, raise a due process claim based on outrageous police conduct. The Court should not foreclose the possibility that government overinvolvement in a crime could be so outrageous in a future case that it would bar conviction on due process grounds or under the Court's supervisory power, regardless of the defendant's predisposition.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The conviction should be barred as a matter of law because the government's conduct was intolerable. The proper focus of an entrapment defense should be on the government's conduct (the objective test), not the defendant's predisposition (the subjective test). Even under the subjective test, the government's role here was far more pervasive than in Russell because the agents supplied the actual contraband and instigated the entire crime from start to finish. This amounts to the government buying contraband from itself through an intermediary and then jailing that intermediary. Such conduct serves no legitimate law enforcement interest and is an abuse of governmental power that should be barred.
Analysis:
This decision firmly entrenches the subjective test for entrapment, making the defendant's predisposition the central and often sole inquiry. The plurality's holding severely restricts a predisposed defendant's ability to challenge a conviction based on 'outrageous government conduct,' suggesting that the entrapment defense is the exclusive remedy for such claims. While the concurrence leaves the door slightly ajar for a future due process challenge in a case with more extreme facts, the practical effect of Hampton is to give law enforcement substantial latitude in undercover operations, including supplying the very contraband for which a defendant is prosecuted, so long as the target is deemed predisposed.
Unlock the full brief for Hampton v. United States