Hammer v. Dagenhart
247 U.S. 251 (1918)
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Rule of Law:
The Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the authority to regulate the conditions of local production or manufacturing, and Congress may not prohibit the interstate shipment of harmless goods as a means to control intrastate activities reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.
Facts:
- Roland Dagenhart was the father of two minor sons, one under the age of 14 and the other between 14 and 16.
- Both sons were employed in a cotton mill in Charlotte, North Carolina.
- Congress enacted the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916.
- This federal law prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of any product from a factory that, within 30 days of the product's removal, had employed children under 14, or children between 14 and 16 for more than eight hours a day or six days a week.
- The employment of Dagenhart's sons violated the standards established by the federal act, which would prevent the cotton mill from shipping its products across state lines.
Procedural Posture:
- Roland Dagenhart filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina on behalf of himself and his two sons.
- The suit sought an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the federal Keating-Owen Child Labor Act.
- The District Court held that the act was unconstitutional and entered a decree enjoining its enforcement.
- The United States government appealed the District Court's decision directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does the Commerce Clause grant Congress the power to prohibit the interstate transportation of ordinary goods manufactured by children in violation of federal age and hour standards?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Day
No. The Commerce Clause does not grant Congress this power. The act is unconstitutional because it attempts to regulate intrastate matters of local production, a power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment, rather than regulating interstate commerce itself. The court reasoned that production is distinct from commerce; the manufacturing of goods is a purely local activity that concludes before interstate commerce begins. Unlike previous cases involving lottery tickets or impure food, the goods produced here (cotton products) are in themselves harmless. The true intent of the statute is not to regulate transportation, but to standardize child labor laws among the states, which is an impermissible invasion of state sovereignty. Congress cannot use the commerce power to equalize economic conditions or to force states to adopt its preferred police power regulations.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Holmes
Yes. The act is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The power to regulate commerce among the states is plenary and unqualified, and it necessarily includes the power to prohibit the shipment of any goods. The statute on its face only regulates the transportation of goods across state lines, which is squarely within congressional authority. The court should not invalidate an otherwise constitutional act based on its indirect effects or its perceived motive to influence state labor policies. When states send their products across state lines, they are no longer within their exclusive rights and are subject to the national public policy as expressed by Congress through its commerce power.
Analysis:
This decision established a restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, creating a firm doctrinal wall between manufacturing and commerce. It solidified the theory of "dual federalism," viewing federal and state governments as operating in separate, mutually exclusive spheres of authority. By declaring that production was outside the scope of federal control, the Court significantly limited Congress's ability to address nationwide economic and social issues for over two decades. This precedent was a major obstacle to New Deal legislation until it was expressly overruled in United States v. Darby Lumber Co. (1941), which adopted the broader view of the commerce power articulated in Holmes's dissent.
