Hamm v. Hazelwood
292 Va. 153, 787 S.E.2d 144, 2016 Va. LEXIS 96 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
A condition in a real property deed that creates a possibility of reverter upon the property's acquisition by a single, named individual is a reasonable and valid restraint on alienation, not a void condition repugnant to the estate conveyed.
Facts:
- In 1989, Dorothy Bigelow Hamm executed a deed of gift transferring her one-half interest in a property to her sister, Melba Bigelow Clarke, while reserving a life estate for herself.
- The deed contained a provision stating the property would automatically revert to Dorothy or her heirs if Melba's son, Reginald Wayne Clarke, ever acquired any interest in or occupied the property.
- In 2004, Dorothy died, and her will left any interest she retained in the property to her son, Edward L. Hamm, Jr.
- In 2012, Melba died intestate (without a will), making her children, including Reginald, her legal heirs who stood to inherit the property.
Procedural Posture:
- The administrator of Melba Bigelow Clarke's estate filed a petition in the circuit court.
- The petition requested a declaration that the reversionary clause in the 1989 deed was a void and unenforceable restraint on alienation.
- Edward L. Hamm, Jr., as the beneficiary of the reversionary interest, appeared in court to argue that the clause was a valid possibility of reverter.
- The circuit court ruled in favor of the estate's administrator, declaring the possibility of reverter void and striking it from the deed.
- Edward L. Hamm, Jr., (appellant) appealed the circuit court's decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
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Issue:
Does a provision in a deed of gift, which states that the property shall automatically revert to the grantor if a specific, named individual ever acquires an interest in it, constitute a void and unenforceable restraint on alienation under Virginia law?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice D. Arthur Kelsey
No. The provision in the deed of gift is a valid and enforceable possibility of reverter, not a void restraint on alienation. The common law voids only general restraints on alienation that are unlimited as to time and person. The restraint here is reasonable because it is narrowly tailored, being limited in scope to a single individual (Reginald) and in duration to that individual's lifetime. The court determined that Dorothy's clear intent was not to convey a fee simple absolute, but a fee simple defeasible subject to a condition subsequent. This type of reversionary interest, known as a possibility of reverter, is a recognized property interest that is inheritable and may be transmitted by will, and courts must give effect to the grantor's clearly expressed intention to create such an interest.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of permissible restraints on alienation in Virginia property law, affirming that not all such restraints are void. It establishes that a narrowly tailored restraint, limited to a specific person for their lifetime, is considered reasonable and enforceable. By characterizing the provision as a valid 'possibility of reverter' tied to a 'fee simple defeasible,' the court reinforces the principle of honoring the grantor's specific intent as expressed in the deed. This ruling provides a clear precedent for grantors wishing to place specific, person-based conditions on property conveyances, distinguishing such conditions from the historically prohibited general restraints that remove all power of alienation.
