Hamiel v. State
1979 Wisc. LEXIS 2208, 92 Wis. 2d 656, 285 N.W.2d 639 (1979)
Rule of Law:
Wisconsin's general attempt statute does not require proof of an intervening extraneous factor as a separate element of the crime, but rather that element serves to demonstrate the actor's requisite criminal intent and unlikelihood of voluntary desistance. A criminal defendant's constitutional right to self-representation is not absolute and may be properly denied when asserted for the first time on the day of trial if it would cause delay or obstruct the orderly administration of justice.
Facts:
- On October 2, 1975, Amelia Mazurcek observed a dark blue car driving the wrong way on a one-way street, three Black men exiting it, walking toward Hampton Avenue, and later running back to the car before speeding off.
- On October 2, 1975, Dorothy Long, a customer at Andrew's Pharmacy, saw three men, including John Lee Hamiel, Jr., enter the pharmacy, and heard Hamiel state "He had a gun" while his hand was in his jacket pocket.
- Cheryl McQueen, a clerk at Andrew's Pharmacy, made change for Hamiel at the sales counter, after which Hamiel returned and demanded she "bag the money," stating "I got a gun" with his hands in his pockets.
- Annette Singleton, another employee at the pharmacy, observed Cheryl McQueen taking money from the cash register and realized Hamiel was attempting to rob the place, after which Hamiel told Singleton: "Don't, stay right here, if you go back there I will shoot her."
- Singleton then saw a police paddy wagon approach, and Hamiel and the other two men ran out of the store without the money.
- Raymond Madritsch, the owner of Andrew's Pharmacy, was in the rear of the store, noticed three men enter, and upon seeing two men go to the back, approached them before seeing all three men running down Hampton Avenue shortly thereafter.
Procedural Posture:
- A criminal complaint was issued against John Lee Hamiel, Jr., charging him with party to the crime of attempted robbery.
- Hamiel moved to dismiss the action based on insufficiency of evidence at the preliminary hearing.
- The trial commenced on April 13, 1976, where Hamiel first moved to adjourn to hire a different attorney, which the court denied.
- Hamiel then requested to represent himself, which the trial court denied due to the untimely nature of the request on the morning of trial.
- Following jury selection, Hamiel moved to suppress identification evidence, which the court denied.
- The jury found Hamiel guilty of being a party to the crime of attempted robbery.
- The trial court sentenced Hamiel to an indeterminate term of not more than 4 years.
- Hamiel moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, arguing insufficient proof of an extraneous factor and improper denial of self-representation.
- The trial court summarily denied Hamiel's post-verdict motion and confirmed the denial with a written order on February 2, 1977.
- Hamiel sought review of the judgment of conviction and the order denying his post-verdict motions via two writs of error to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
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Issue:
1. Does Wisconsin's general attempt statute, sec. 939.32(2), Stats., require the prosecution to establish the intervention of another person or some other intervening extrinsic force as a separate element of the crime? 2. Did the trial court improperly deny John Lee Hamiel, Jr.'s last-minute request to proceed without counsel on the day of trial, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation?
Opinions:
Majority - Coffey, J.
No, Wisconsin's general attempt statute does not require the prosecution to establish the intervention of another person or some other intervening extrinsic force as a separate element of the crime of attempt; rather, such intervention is indicative of the defendant's intent not to voluntarily cease from completing the crime. No, the trial court did not improperly deny John Lee Hamiel, Jr.'s last-minute request to proceed pro se because the request was untimely and appeared to be for delay, thereby failing to meet the requirements for exercising this right without obstructing justice. Regarding the attempt statute, the court clarified that sec. 939.32(2), Stats., like common law, defines the crime of attempt with two elements: criminal intent (mens rea) and acts taken in furtherance of that intent (actus reus). The clause "except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor" is not an additional, separate element, but rather part of the "equivocality test." This test requires the accused's actions to "demonstrate unequivocally" that they formed the intent and would have committed the crime but for intervention, serving to provide evidence of the requisite criminal intent and show that the defendant did not voluntarily abandon the crime. The court emphasized that the key inquiry is whether, under all the facts and circumstances, the accused was likely to voluntarily cease and desist, and there is no need to show a causal connection between an extrinsic force and the frustration of the defendant's plan. Hamiel's actions, such as demanding money and making threats, clearly demonstrated the intent to commit robbery and indicated an improbable voluntary desistance. Regarding the right to self-representation, the court acknowledged the constitutional right established in Faretta v. California, but noted that Faretta did not address the timing of such a request. The court held that this right cannot be manipulated to obstruct the orderly administration of justice or delay trials. When a request to proceed pro se is made on the day of trial or immediately prior, the trial court must determine if the request is merely to secure delay or a tactical advantage. The court should consider factors such as whether the request could have been made earlier, the reasons for the delay, and the potential disruption or delay to the court's schedule, witnesses, and jurors. Given Hamiel's request came on the morning of trial, six months after his counsel was appointed, and would have necessitated a continuance, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the request, as the primary objective appeared to be delaying the trial.
Analysis:
This case provides crucial clarification on the interpretation of Wisconsin's criminal attempt statute, definitively stating that the intervention of an extraneous factor is not a distinct element of the crime but rather evidence of the defendant's unwavering intent. This interpretation shifts the focus from external events to the defendant's internal state and actions, streamlining the prosecution of attempt cases. Furthermore, the court establishes a clear framework for trial judges to evaluate last-minute requests for self-representation, balancing a defendant's constitutional rights against the practical need for an orderly judicial process. This will impact future cases by providing guidance on when such requests can be denied without infringing on due process, particularly when they appear to be dilatory tactics.
