Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi.
199 L. Ed. 2d 249, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A time limit for filing an appeal is jurisdictional only if it is prescribed by a statute enacted by Congress. A time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule, such as the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, is a non-jurisdictional, mandatory claim-processing rule that is subject to forfeiture if not timely raised by the opposing party.
Facts:
- Charmaine Hamer filed an employment discrimination complaint against Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, entering a final judgment on September 14, 2015.
- Hamer's original deadline to file a notice of appeal was October 14, 2015.
- On October 8, 2015, Hamer's attorneys moved to withdraw and requested a two-month extension for Hamer to file her appeal, allowing her time to find new counsel.
- The District Court granted the motion and extended the appeal deadline to December 14, 2015, which was longer than the 30-day limit specified in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C).
- Neighborhood Housing Services and Fannie Mae did not object to the length of the extension granted by the District Court.
- Hamer filed her notice of appeal on December 11, 2015, within the extended deadline set by the District Court but after the 30-day limit in the Rule would have expired.
Procedural Posture:
- Charmaine Hamer sued Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
- The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
- The District Court then granted Hamer's motion for an extension of time to file an appeal, setting a deadline that exceeded the limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C).
- Hamer filed her notice of appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- In their initial filings, the appellees (Neighborhood Housing Services and Fannie Mae) stated that Hamer's appeal was timely.
- The Seventh Circuit, acting on its own initiative, questioned the timeliness of the appeal.
- The Seventh Circuit held that the time limit was jurisdictional and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the District Court's extension was too long.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Hamer's petition for a writ of certiorari.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is the time limit on extensions for filing a notice of appeal, prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) rather than by statute, a jurisdictional requirement that deprives an appellate court of authority over an untimely appeal?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. The time limit prescribed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) is a mandatory claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional one. The court reasoned that only Congress, not the judiciary, can determine the subject-matter jurisdiction of lower federal courts. Therefore, a time prescription is jurisdictional only if it appears in a statute. The time limit at issue here, governing the length of an extension for filing a notice of appeal, is found only in a court-promulgated rule (Rule 4(a)(5)(C)), not in the relevant statute (28 U.S.C. § 2107). While mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced if properly raised by a party, they are subject to waiver or forfeiture if a party fails to object. Because the defendants failed to object to the District Court's overlong extension, they forfeited their right to challenge its timeliness, and the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the appeal on its own initiative for lack of jurisdiction.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the Court's recent jurisprudence narrowing the scope of what constitutes a 'jurisdictional' rule. It establishes a clear, bright-line test: if a time limit is statutory, it's jurisdictional; if it's from a court-made rule, it's a mandatory but forfeitable claim-processing rule. This holding shifts the burden onto litigants to police procedural compliance with court rules, as appellate courts can no longer raise such non-statutory time-bar issues on their own initiative if the parties have not. The decision prevents harsh, case-ending dismissals based on procedural missteps that the opposing party did not object to at the time.
