Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
542 U.S. 507 (2004)
Rule of Law:
Although Congress authorized the detention of enemy combatants through the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the Due Process Clause requires that a U.S. citizen detained in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.
Facts:
- Yaser Esam Hamdi was born a U.S. citizen in Louisiana in 1980.
- Hamdi moved to Saudi Arabia as a child and, by 2001, was residing in Afghanistan.
- In late 2001, after U.S. military operations began in Afghanistan, Hamdi was seized by the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban.
- The Northern Alliance turned Hamdi over to the U.S. military.
- The U.S. government alleged that Hamdi had affiliated with a Taliban military unit, received weapons training, and was captured on the battlefield with a Kalishnikov rifle.
- Hamdi's father asserted that his son had traveled to Afghanistan to do relief work, had been there for less than two months before September 11, 2001, and was trapped by the conflict.
- After being transferred to Guantanamo Bay, the government learned Hamdi was a U.S. citizen and moved him to naval brigs in Virginia and South Carolina.
- The government classified Hamdi as an "enemy combatant" and held him indefinitely without formal charges, access to counsel, or court proceedings.
Procedural Posture:
- Esam Fouad Hamdi, Yaser Hamdi's father, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of his son in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
- The District Court appointed counsel for Hamdi and ordered that the government provide access to the detainee.
- On appeal by the government, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's order, finding it had not shown proper deference to the government's national security interests.
- On remand, the government submitted the 'Mobbs Declaration' as its evidence. The District Court found this insufficient and ordered the production of numerous materials for in camera review.
- The government again appealed, and the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that because it was undisputed that Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat, no further factual inquiry was necessary or proper, and ordered the habeas petition be dismissed.
- Hamdi petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment require that a U.S. citizen detained in the United States as an "enemy combatant" be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
Yes. Due process demands that a U.S. citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The Court first held that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by Congress after September 11, 2001, constitutes the necessary statutory authorization under the Non-Detention Act (18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)) for the President to detain enemy combatants, including U.S. citizens. Detention of combatants is a fundamental and accepted incident of war. However, this authority is not a 'blank check.' Balancing the individual's profound interest in liberty against the government's weighty national security interests under the Mathews v. Eldridge framework, the Court concluded that the process afforded to Hamdi was constitutionally insufficient. An indefinite detention based solely on the executive's 'say-so' creates an unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivation. Therefore, a citizen-detainee must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. This process can be tailored to accommodate military realities, such as by allowing hearsay evidence or using a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's evidence.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Souter
Yes. The detention is unlawful, and Hamdi is entitled to challenge it. I disagree with the plurality that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) provides the required congressional authority to detain a U.S. citizen. The Non-Detention Act (18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)) requires a clear, unambiguous statement from Congress to authorize such a detention, and the AUMF, which never mentions detention, fails to meet this high standard. The government's claim to be acting under the laws of war is also questionable, as it has not afforded Hamdi the prisoner-of-war status protections required by the Geneva Conventions. Because the detention is statutorily unauthorized, Hamdi should be released unless criminal proceedings are initiated. However, to create a majority for a judgment, I join the plurality in vacating and remanding the case to provide Hamdi the opportunity to challenge his status, as this is the closest outcome to the one I would impose.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No, the plurality's approach is incorrect; the Constitution permits only two options for the government to detain a citizen accused of waging war against it: either prosecute him in federal court for treason or another crime, or have Congress formally suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) is not a suspension of the writ. The plurality invents a third option—a judicially-crafted due process hearing—which has no basis in constitutional tradition. This 'Mr. Fix-it' mentality usurps the power of the political branches. The historical precedent, as established in Ex parte Milligan, dictates that absent a suspension of the writ, citizens are entitled to the full protections of the criminal justice system. The proper remedy is to grant Hamdi's habeas petition and order his release unless the government promptly initiates criminal proceedings against him.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The detention of Hamdi is a core exercise of the President's war powers, authorized by the Constitution and Congress, and it is not the judiciary's role to second-guess it. The Executive has determined that Hamdi is an enemy combatant, and this determination is not subject to judicial review. Courts lack the expertise and access to intelligence necessary to review such military decisions, which are committed to the political branches. National security is the government's most compelling interest, and the President must have the discretion to detain enemies to gather intelligence and prevent them from returning to the battlefield. The process Hamdi received—a good-faith determination by the Executive—is all the process he is due. The plurality's application of a balancing test is inappropriate in the context of war powers and incorrectly minimizes the grave security interests at stake.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark decision on the balance between executive power, national security, and individual liberty in the post-9/11 era. It establishes the crucial precedent that the President's wartime powers are not absolute and that U.S. citizens retain core due process rights even when designated as enemy combatants. The plurality's application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to this national security context created a new, flexible framework for such cases, rejecting both the government's call for near-total deference and the dissent's rigid dichotomy of either a criminal trial or habeas suspension. This decision affirmed the judiciary's role as a check on executive power during wartime and set the stage for subsequent litigation over the rights of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere.
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