Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
548 U. S. ____ (2006) (2006)
Rule of Law:
The President of the United States does not have the authority to establish military commissions to try enemy combatants that deviate from the procedural requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and fail to meet the standards of a 'regularly constituted court' under the Geneva Conventions, unless specifically authorized by Congress.
Facts:
- Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national, was captured by militia forces in Afghanistan during hostilities between the United States and the Taliban in November 2001.
- The militia forces turned Hamdan over to the U.S. military, and he allegedly worked as a driver and bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
- In June 2002, the U.S. military transported Hamdan to the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for detention.
- On July 3, 2003, the President of the United States determined that Hamdan was eligible for trial by a military commission.
- On July 13, 2004, the government formally charged Hamdan with one count of conspiracy to commit offenses triable by military commission, based on alleged conduct between 1996 and 2001.
Procedural Posture:
- Hamdan filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, which were transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
- The District Court (a court of first instance) granted Hamdan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding the military commission was unlawful because it violated the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.
- The Government, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, an intermediate appellate court. Hamdan was the appellee.
- The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that the Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforceable and the commission was authorized.
- The U.S. Supreme Court, the highest court, granted Hamdan's petition for certiorari to review the appellate court's decision.
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Issue:
Does a military commission, established by Executive Order to try a non-citizen detainee captured during hostilities, violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions when its structure and procedures differ from those of a standard court-martial?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
Yes. The military commission convened to try Hamdan is unlawful because its structure and procedures violate both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva Conventions. The President's power to convene military commissions, while acknowledged by Article 21 of the UCMJ, must comply with existing statutes and the 'laws of war,' which include the Geneva Conventions. The commission violates the UCMJ's requirement in Article 36(b) that rules for military commissions be 'uniform insofar as practicable' with those for courts-martial, as the government failed to show that departing from established court-martial rules was a matter of practical necessity. Furthermore, the commission violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which applies to the conflict with al Qaeda and requires trials be conducted by a 'regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.' This commission is not 'regularly constituted' because it was established by Executive Order and its procedures deviate from established U.S. military law without justification, such as by permitting the accused to be excluded from his own trial. A plurality also concluded that the charge of 'conspiracy' is not a recognized offense under the law of war triable by a military commission.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
Yes. The military commission is unlawful because Congress has legislated in this area and set limits on the President's authority which the Executive has exceeded. Applying the framework from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the President's power is at its 'lowest ebb' because his actions are incompatible with the will of Congress as expressed in the UCMJ. The UCMJ's uniformity requirement in Article 36(b) and the 'law of war' requirement in Article 21—which incorporates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—both restrict the President's power. The commission is not a 'regularly constituted court' under Common Article 3 because its structure and procedures deviate from the court-martial model without any showing of practical necessity, thus lacking the requisite independence and fairness.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The military commission is a lawful exercise of the President's authority as Commander in Chief, an authority that is at its maximum because it is supported by Congress's Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The Court's decision is an unprecedented and dangerous intrusion into the Executive's constitutional authority to wage war. The crime of conspiracy is a well-established violation of the law of war, and the procedures of the commission are consistent with historical practice and do not violate the UCMJ. Furthermore, the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable by private individuals, and in any event, Common Article 3 does not apply to the international conflict with al Qaeda. Even if it did, the commission satisfies its requirements.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No. The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) unambiguously stripped all federal courts, including the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees, effective immediately for all pending cases. The Court's interpretation, which creates an exception for pending cases through a flawed negative inference, is patently erroneous and ignores a long line of precedent holding that jurisdiction-stripping statutes apply to pending cases unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise. Even if jurisdiction existed, the Court should have abstained from interfering with an ongoing military proceeding out of comity to the Executive Branch.
Analysis:
This landmark decision significantly curtailed the Executive Branch's asserted unilateral wartime powers, establishing that the President must operate within the legal constraints set by Congress and ratified international treaties. By subjecting the Guantanamo military commissions to the requirements of the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions, the Court reinforced the principles of separation of powers and judicial oversight, even in matters of national security. The ruling invalidated the first version of the military commissions and directly prompted Congress to pass the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to provide the specific statutory authorization that the Court found lacking.
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