Hallums v. United States
2004 WL 253372, 841 A.2d 1270, 2004 D.C. App. LEXIS 48 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
The District of Columbia formally adopts the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, which allows for the admission of a statement describing or explaining an event made while the declarant is perceiving it. However, an out-of-court identification statement may not qualify if it is based on memory and reflection from a prior event rather than a spontaneous description of the current observation.
Facts:
- On January 13, 1998, security officers Kenneth Barrick and Officer Lee were monitoring the Lord & Taylor department store via closed-circuit television.
- They observed a woman enter the store and remove several Coach handbags from a display rack.
- While watching the monitor, Officer Lee stated, "that’s Theresa Hallums," indicating he recognized her from a previous occasion involving stolen handbags.
- Lee instructed Barrick to apprehend the woman, but by the time Barrick reached the store's exit 10 to 15 seconds later, he saw the woman outside getting into a waiting van.
- Barrick saw the woman glance over her shoulder before the van sped away.
- Another security manager, Danielle Gibson, reviewed the videotape after the incident and recognized the woman as Theresa Hallums.
- Gibson stated she had previously observed Hallums at close range for about forty-five minutes at a nearby Hecht's store approximately three months earlier.
Procedural Posture:
- Theresa Hallums was charged with second-degree theft.
- Hallums was tried in a bench trial before a judge in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the trial court of first instance.
- During the trial, the prosecution introduced the out-of-court statement of Officer Lee identifying Hallums.
- Defense counsel objected to the statement as inadmissible hearsay.
- The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the statement under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.
- The trial judge found Hallums guilty, expressly relying in part on Lee's out-of-court identification.
- Hallums (appellant) appealed her conviction to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court's evidentiary ruling.
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Issue:
Does an out-of-court identification statement, made by a declarant who is unavailable for cross-examination while contemporaneously observing an event on a video monitor, qualify as an admissible present sense impression under the hearsay rule?
Opinions:
Majority - PER CURIAM
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The court is divided on the reasoning. Judge Reid concludes any error in admitting the statement was harmless, and Judge Glickman concludes there was no error. Judge Ruiz dissents, finding harmful constitutional error.
Majority - Ruiz, Associate Judge
Does not answer the issue as applied to the case facts, but establishes the legal rule for the jurisdiction. This opinion, writing for the court on Parts I and II, formally adopts the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule in the District of Columbia. The exception allows admission of statements describing or explaining an event made while perceiving it, based on the rationale that the contemporaneity of the event and statement negates the likelihood of misrepresentation. The court notes that jurisdictions are split on whether safeguards like corroboration are needed, but declines to adopt a specific approach in this case.
Concurring - Reid, Associate Judge
Does not answer. Even assuming it was error to admit Officer Lee's statement, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The in-court identifications by Kenneth Barrick and Danielle Gibson, combined with the videotape evidence, were sufficiently strong to secure the conviction. Barrick identified Hallums both from the monitor and in person as she fled, and Gibson identified her based on the videotape and a prior 45-minute observation. Therefore, the outcome of the trial would have been the same even without Lee's hearsay statement.
Concurring - Glickman, Associate Judge
Yes. An out-of-court identification qualifies as an admissible present sense impression because the statement was a spontaneous declaration made while observing the event. The argument that it is not spontaneous because it relies on memory is flawed, as every valid identification necessarily depends on memory of past contact with the person. The court further reasons that the present sense impression exception is a 'firmly rooted' hearsay exception, like the excited utterance exception, and therefore its admission does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.
Dissenting - Ruiz, Associate Judge
No. An identification that requires reflection and recall from memory is not a truly spontaneous description of a current event and thus falls outside the present sense impression exception. Lee's statement was not merely describing the woman on the screen but was identifying her based on a memory of a prior incident. More importantly, its admission violated the Confrontation Clause because the present sense impression exception is not 'firmly rooted' and Lee's statement lacked the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' necessary to substitute for cross-examination. The error was not harmless because the trial judge explicitly stated the case was 'close' and relied on Lee's identification as one of the three key pieces of evidence for conviction.
Analysis:
This case formally establishes the present sense impression hearsay exception in the District of Columbia, aligning its evidence law with the Federal Rules. However, the fractured opinions leave unresolved the crucial question of whether an out-of-court identification based on prior knowledge can be admitted under this exception, especially when the declarant is unavailable. The dissent's focus on the Confrontation Clause highlights the tension between established hearsay exceptions and a defendant's constitutional rights, an area of law later transformed by the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington. The case illustrates the difficulty courts face in applying general evidentiary rules to identification testimony, which carries a high risk of prejudice and unreliability.
