Yes, this was totally unfair and violated the Constitution. A 15-year-old kid is not a small adult and can't be treated like one. Questioning a scared teenager all night with teams of cops is bound to overwhelm him and make him say whatever they want. He needed a lawyer or a friendly adult there for support. Just reading him his rights doesn't count, because a kid in that stressful situation can't really understand his options or feel free to say no.

No, the confession was handled properly. The question of whether the police bullied him was a 'he said, she said' situation. The judge and jury who were actually in the courtroom heard from everyone and decided to believe the police. It's not the Supreme Court's job to second-guess their decision from Washington D.C. The local courts followed the right procedure, and that should be respected.

No, it's not okay. The way the police got 15-year-old Haley to confess violated his rights. They questioned him for hours in the middle of the night with no adult to help him and used scary pressure tactics. The Court says this kind of behavior by police is wrong and can't be allowed. Haley's confession should never have been used in court because it was forced out of him unfairly. When a kid confesses, the courts have to be extra careful to make sure the police didn't bully or scare them into it.

I agree with the decision to reverse the case because a 15‐year‐old should never be pushed into giving a confession after being questioned for so many hours without a lawyer or trusted adult present. The long, pressured interrogation made it very hard for the boy to truly make a free choice. However, I see things a bit differently from the majority because I think that if proper safeguards are in place, sometimes the situation might not be as unfair. But here, because the boy was clearly overwhelmed and his rights were not protected, reversing the conviction is the right call.

This case is about whether we believe Haley's story or the police officers' story about how they got Haley's confession. The Court isn't saying Ohio's rules about using confessions in court are wrong. If we believe the police, then Haley confessed freely. As the Supreme Court, we shouldn't assume the police pressured Haley just because he's young, when there's plenty of evidence showing his confession was voluntary if the judges and jury believed the police. The Court is wrong to guess about facts while ignoring the people in the courtroom who actually saw and heard the evidence. Unless there's strong proof that the police forced the confession, we shouldn't say they were mean to Haley or reverse his conviction because it wasn't fair.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that juvenile confessions call for "special care" in evaluating voluntariness

Arkansas, "this Court has uniformly held that even though there may have been sufficient evidence, apart from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction, the admission in evidence, over objection, of the coerced confession vitiates the judgment because it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.

That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens

—the police, "in relays of one or two each," questioned a fifteen year old defendant for five hours, commencing the interrogation shortly after midnight.

As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged long ago, a juvenile in custody who faces questioning needs "support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush him."

The Court recognized that "[a] ge 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy.... He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity."

Douglas that "when** a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used."

Although a close case, the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of PWG in this case persuade us that a reasonable 13-year-old child would not have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave.

For example, a fifteen-year old's confession was found involuntary after the boy was taken from his home in the middle of the night and subjected to relentless questioning.

Yes, the use of the confession violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When the accused is a juvenile, special care must be used in scrutinizing the record, as a 15-year-old cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. The combination of the boy's tender age, the dead-of-night questioning, the five-hour duration, the use of police in relays, and the total absence of counsel or a friendly adult created a coercive environment. A formal recitation of constitutional rights is meaningless when a youth lacks the capacity to fully appreciate the advice or exercise a free choice under such pressure. The police's subsequent callous behavior in holding the boy incommunicado further confirms that the interrogation methods were fundamentally unfair.

Yes, the confession should have been excluded because the circumstances of the interrogation preclude a finding that it was voluntary. Determining voluntariness is a psychological judgment reflecting societal standards of fairness, not a mathematical formula. The uncontested facts—a 15-year-old questioned incommunicado by relays of officers for five hours overnight without being apprised of his right to silence or counsel—made it impossible for him to exercise a deliberate and responsible choice. Such methods, which effectively withhold a suspect's ability to appreciate and assert his rights, are contrary to the deeply rooted feelings of the community and thus violate due process.

No, the admission of the confession did not violate the Due Process Clause. The core issue is a question of fact regarding the credibility of witnesses, which the trial court and jury are in the best position to determine. The testimony regarding coercion was in direct conflict, and the triers of fact were entitled to believe the police officers who testified that no force or intimidation was used. The Supreme Court should not disregard the findings of the state courts by drawing its own inferences from a cold record. The Ohio procedure for determining voluntariness was fair, and the triers of fact's determination was not so lacking in evidentiary support as to constitute a fundamental unfairness.

Yes. The methods used to obtain the confession from Haley, a 15-year-old minor, violate the due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. The totality of the circumstances, including Haley's age, the duration and time of the interrogation, the absence of counsel or a supportive adult, and the callous attitude of the police demonstrate that the confession was not voluntary but coerced. The Court cannot condone such methods that flout constitutional requirements. Because the use of a coerced confession as evidence violates due process, its admission vitiates the judgment, even if there was sufficient evidence apart from it to support the conviction. Special care must be taken in scrutinizing the record when a juvenile confession is involved, given a child's unique vulnerability to the intimidating presence of law enforcement.

I join the Court’s reversal because the methods used in eliciting the confession from a 15‐year‐old—marked by a prolonged, relay-style interrogation without the benefit of counsel—undoubtedly undermine the due process guarantees enshrined in our Constitution. I concur with the reversal on the ground that such coercive practices compromise the fairness of the proceedings; however, I differ from the majority in that I urge a more nuanced, case‐by‐case assessment. I believe that while the overwhelming vulnerability of a juvenile necessitates extra protective measures because his capacity for free choice is inherently limited, careful scrutiny of police protocols might, in other circumstances, permit a more balanced evaluation of voluntariness. My concurrence thus supports the reversal while cautioning against an overly categorical exclusion of confessions obtained under similarly challenging conditions.

The narrow issue here turns on the credibility of witnesses regarding the specific methods used to obtain Haley's confession. The procedure adopted by Ohio to determine the admissibility of confessions is not criticized by the Court. If the unequivocal testimony of the police officers is believed, the confession was clearly voluntary. As a reviewing court, we should not presume coercion merely based on Haley's age when the record contains ample evidence, if believed, to support the trial court's conclusion that the confession was voluntary. The Court improperly relies on conjecture drawn from limited undisputed facts while disregarding the determination of the triers of fact who were best positioned to evaluate the credibility of the sharply conflicting testimony. In the absence of substantial proof that the confession was coerced, we should not charge the police with callousness toward their constitutional obligations or reverse the conviction as lacking fundamental fairness.

Haley v. Ohio

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