Hagopian v. Justice Administrative Commission
18 So.3d 625, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 11226, 2009 WL 2450520 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
An attorney may establish good cause to withdraw from an involuntary court appointment under Florida Bar Rule 4-6.2 if the representation is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, such as being unable to provide competent representation to existing clients.
Facts:
- Florida enacted Chapter 2007-62, which created a flat-fee system with low compensation for court-appointed counsel, causing many private criminal defense attorneys in Manatee County to remove themselves from the voluntary appointment registry.
- The Statewide Prosecutor began filing complex, multi-defendant RICO prosecutions against alleged street gang members in Manatee County.
- Due to the shortage of volunteer attorneys, the circuit court created an 'Involuntary Appointment List' to assign counsel to indigent defendants in these cases.
- Terry Green was charged in a RICO case involving twelve defendants.
- After two previously appointed attorneys withdrew, the court involuntarily appointed Gregory Hagopian, a solo practitioner with a single secretary and significant monthly overhead, to represent Green.
- Hagopian had previously been on the voluntary registry but removed his name after the new compensation law passed.
- The case against Green was exceptionally large, involving 382 witnesses, 176 police reports, and nine alleged predicate acts for Green alone.
- Hagopian estimated the case would require a minimum of 500 pre-trial hours plus a multi-week trial, which would consume his practice, prevent him from serving existing clients, and likely lead to financial ruin.
Procedural Posture:
- The State of Florida charged Terry Green and eleven codefendants with racketeering and conspiracy in the Manatee County Circuit Court, the trial court of first instance.
- The court involuntarily appointed two different attorneys to represent Green, both of whom were permitted to withdraw.
- The circuit court then involuntarily appointed Gregory Hagopian to represent Green.
- Hagopian filed a motion to withdraw, asserting that the appointment would cause an unreasonable financial burden and create a conflict of interest.
- After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court denied Hagopian's motion to withdraw but also found the statutory fee cap unconstitutional as applied and set a higher hourly compensation rate.
- Hagopian petitioned the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, an intermediate appellate court, for a writ of certiorari to quash the trial court's order denying his motion.
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Issue:
Does a trial court's denial of a solo practitioner's motion to withdraw from an involuntary appointment to a complex, multi-defendant RICO case constitute a departure from the essential requirements of the law where the representation would impose a ruinous financial burden and prevent the attorney from competently serving his existing clients?
Opinions:
Majority - Wallace, Judge.
Yes, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law by denying the motion to withdraw. An attorney may avoid an involuntary appointment for 'good cause' under Rule 4-6.2 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. The court found Mr. Hagopian established two grounds for good cause. First, under Rule 4-6.2(a), the representation was likely to result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct because the immense time commitment would make it impossible for Mr. Hagopian to provide competent and diligent representation to his existing clients. Second, under Rule 4-6.2(b), the appointment would result in an 'unreasonable financial burden,' as the undisputed evidence showed that the combination of the enormous effort required and the minimal, uncertain compensation threatened to ruin Mr. Hagopian's solo law practice. The court distinguished this situation from cases where attorneys seek higher fees after completing representation, emphasizing that here, the attorney sought to withdraw at the outset due to the prospective ruinous impact.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the 'good cause' standard under which an attorney can withdraw from an involuntary court appointment, particularly for solo and small-firm practitioners. It establishes that a prospective, unreasonable financial burden that threatens the viability of a lawyer's practice, combined with the inability to competently represent existing clients, can justify withdrawal. The decision balances the state's need to provide counsel for indigent defendants with the professional and financial realities faced by private attorneys, setting a precedent that courts must consider the devastating economic impact an exceptionally complex and underfunded case can have on an appointed lawyer.
