Hagaman v. Board of Education of Woodbridge
117 N.J. Super. 446, 1971 N.J. Super. LEXIS 438, 285 A.2d 63 (1971)
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Rule of Law:
A conveyance of land that merely states the purpose for which the property is to be used, without specific words of limitation (e.g., 'so long as') or condition (e.g., 'on condition that') and without an explicit right of re-entry or possibility of reverter, creates a fee simple absolute, not a defeasible fee that causes forfeiture if the stated use ceases.
Facts:
- On October 20, 1925, the plaintiff's parents conveyed a parcel of real property to the Board of Education of the Township of Woodbridge.
- The deed contained a provision stating the land was conveyed 'solely for the purpose of being used for the erection and maintenance of a public school or schools' and that a school would be erected.
- The Board of Education built a school on the property and used it for educational purposes for several decades.
- In approximately 1968, the Board closed the school building.
- Following the school's closure, the Board of Education began using the property as a recreational park and playground, equipped with swings, monkey bars, and basketball courts.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, heir of the original grantors, filed a complaint in the trial court seeking possession of the property from the Board of Education of the Township of Woodbridge.
- Both the plaintiff and the defendant Board of Education moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint.
- The plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment to the appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a deed provision stating that land is conveyed 'solely for the purpose of being used for the erection and maintenance of a public school' create a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, causing the property to revert to the grantor's heir when it ceases to be used for school purposes?
Opinions:
Majority - Lane, J. A. D.
No. A deed provision that merely states the purpose of the conveyance does not create a fee simple determinable or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. The court reasoned that there is a strong judicial policy against interpreting conveyances in a way that causes a forfeiture of property. To create a defeasible fee, the grantor's intent must be clear and unequivocal. A fee simple determinable requires durational language (e.g., 'so long as,' 'while'), while a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent requires conditional language (e.g., 'on condition that') and typically a clause specifying a right of re-entry. The language in this deed merely expresses the grantors' purpose and motivation for the conveyance; it does not contain the specific words of limitation or condition required to create a future interest that would cause the property to revert to the grantor's heir upon the cessation of school use.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high bar required to create a defeasible fee and the strong judicial preference for interpreting conveyances as creating a fee simple absolute. It serves as a clear warning to drafters that a mere statement of purpose is legally insufficient to make a grantee's estate forfeitable. To retain a future interest, a grantor must use precise, unambiguous language of duration or condition, explicitly reserving a possibility of reverter or a right of re-entry. The decision solidifies the principle that courts will strictly construe any language alleged to create a condition subsequent or limitation, resolving any doubt in favor of the grantee and against forfeiture.
