Haga v. Blanc & West Lumber Co., Inc.
666 S.W.2d 61, 1984 Tenn. LEXIS 757 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
In negligence cases, the issues of a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption of risk are questions of fact for the jury. An appellate court may not reweigh the evidence and overturn a jury's verdict so long as there is any material evidence to support it.
Facts:
- Plaintiff Haga, a residential housing constructor, went to defendant Blanc and West Lumber Company to purchase two large boards.
- After paying, an employee, Adrian Blanc, accompanied Haga to a lumber shed and told him he would have to retrieve the boards himself from a designated stack.
- The lumber was arranged in strapped bundles stacked several feet high.
- Haga climbed between two adjacent stacks to get the boards.
- As Haga began to descend, boards from both stacks slid because the metal securing bands on both top bundles were broken, causing him to fall and suffer serious back injuries.
- Blanc knew prior to Haga's climb that the bands on both stacks were broken but did not warn Haga or offer assistance.
Procedural Posture:
- Haga (plaintiff) filed a negligence action against Blanc and West Lumber Company and Adrian Blanc (defendants) in a Tennessee trial court.
- The defendants asserted the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.
- A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Haga, for $30,000.00, which the trial judge approved.
- The defendants (appellants) appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, reversed the trial court's judgment and directed a verdict for the defendants.
- The plaintiff, Haga, sought and was granted discretionary review by the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
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Issue:
Did the intermediate appellate court err by overturning a jury verdict and finding that the plaintiff assumed the risk of his injury as a matter of law, when there was material evidence that the plaintiff did not know of the specific dangerous condition that caused his fall?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brock
Yes. The intermediate appellate court erred because the questions of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are peculiarly issues for the trier of fact, and the appellate court is not at liberty to reweigh evidence when the jury's verdict is supported by material evidence. The court adopted the reasoning of the lower court's dissent, emphasizing that the standard of review requires appellate courts to take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the verdict. Under the three-part test for assumption of risk—(1) knowledge of the danger, (2) appreciation of the danger, and (3) voluntary exposure—there were factual issues for the jury to resolve. While Haga had general knowledge of the danger of climbing lumber, there was evidence he did not have knowledge of the specific danger—that the bands on both stacks were broken. Since a business owner has a duty to protect invitees even from known or obvious dangers if the owner should anticipate harm, the jury could reasonably conclude that Blanc invited Haga to encounter a dangerous condition without warning. Therefore, the jury's verdict must be reinstated.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reinforces the deference appellate courts must give to jury verdicts in negligence cases, particularly concerning affirmative defenses. It clarifies that assumption of risk is not established merely by a plaintiff's general awareness of a potentially hazardous activity. The ruling requires a more granular, fact-specific inquiry into whether the plaintiff knew of, appreciated, and voluntarily exposed themself to the specific defect or condition that caused the harm, making it more difficult for defendants to prevail on this defense as a matter of law before or after a jury verdict.
