Yes, the city can shut down the factory. The government's most important job is to protect its people, and this "police power" is very strong. Even though the factory was there first, the needs of the community changed as the city grew. The court said that one person's business interests can't stand in the way of progress for the whole community. While the law made his land less valuable, it was a fair use of power to stop the factory's smoke and fumes from bothering the new neighbors. The city didn't take his clay; it just stopped him from cooking it into bricks in that specific spot.

No, the city's rule isn't against the Constitution. The government has a special power to make rules for the health and happiness of everyone. This power is really strong and can affect property values, but it's not being used unfairly here. The city made this rule to make the neighborhood better, not to hurt Mr. Hadacheck's business on purpose. Even though Mr. Hadacheck might lose money, the needs of the whole city are more important. The city's decision is okay unless it's proven they were being really unfair or mean, which Mr. Hadacheck couldn't show. The Supreme Court has said before that just because property loses value, it doesn't mean it's a 'taking'.

—on review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of this state involving the validity and enforcement of a zoning ordinance (165 Cal. 416 [132 P. 584, LRA 1916B 1248]), that the imperative necessity for the existence of the police power "precludes any limitations upon it when not exercised arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because of conditions …

As a valid exercise of the police power, zoning is not a compensable taking, even when it results in substantial reduction in the value of property.

—for example, the US Supreme Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited the operation of a brickyard or brick kiln within certain limits in the City of Los Angeles.

Rogin relied on decisions by the United States Supreme Court which found no taking where a challenged law had reduced the value of land by as much as seventy-five or eighty-seven percent.

The police power, generally, has been referred to as "... one of the most essential powers of government, one that is the least limitable

—the decisions of the Supreme Court "uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a `taking.'"

—is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining [case cited]. To so hold would preclude development and fix a city forever in its …

—upholding ordinance prohibiting operation of otherwise lawful brickyard business that legislature found inconsistent with neighboring uses

The Hadacheck per se rule tells us that where a court is acting to abate a nuisance, the attendant restrictions on the property rights of the party that created the nuisance should never amount to takings.

There is no serious difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations fixing the height of buildings within reasonable limits, the character of materials and methods of construction, and the adjoining area which must be left open, in order to minimize the danger of fire or collapse, the evils of overcrowding, and the like, and excluding from residential …

No, the municipal ordinance does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The police power is one of the most essential and least limitable powers of government, and it cannot be limited by pre-existing vested interests when its exercise is not arbitrary. The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would preclude development and fix a city in its primitive conditions, preventing progress for the good of the community. While the ordinance may diminish the value of Hadacheck's property, it is a legitimate exercise of police power to regulate a business that, due to the changing character of the neighborhood, has become a nuisance or detrimental to public health and comfort. The court distinguished this from an absolute prohibition on removing the clay, noting the ordinance only prohibits its manufacture into bricks on that specific site, a regulation aimed at the business's operational effects on the surrounding residential area.

No. The ordinance does not constitute a compensable taking under the Fourteenth Amendment because the police power of the state is essential and may be exerted to ensure the community's welfare, even if it affects individual interests. The city's action is presumed to be valid unless shown to be arbitrary or discriminatory, which is not the case here. The prohibition of brick-making within the specified district is a legitimate exercise of the city's police power to regulate health and comfort, and the petitioner's investment interests cannot override the community's progress. The ordinance is not discriminatory as it applies to all within its terms, and there is no clear evidence of an intent to harm the petitioner individually or to foster a monopoly. The city's judgment must be respected in the absence of a clear showing of bad faith or arbitrary action. The Supreme Court's decisions uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking'.

Hadacheck v. Sebastian

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