Haaland v. Brackeen
599 U.S. 255 (2023)
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Rule of Law:
Congress has broad authority under its Article I powers over Indian affairs to enact legislation like the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) that governs state-court child custody proceedings. Such legislation does not violate the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering principle when its requirements apply generally to state and private actors or impose ancillary recordkeeping duties on state courts.
Facts:
- A.L.M., an Indian child, was placed in foster care with a non-Indian couple, Chad and Jennifer Brackeen, who later sought to adopt him.
- A.L.M.'s biological parents supported the Brackeens' adoption, but the Navajo Nation intervened under ICWA, identifying a potential alternative placement with a non-relative tribal family.
- Altagracia Hernandez, a non-Indian biological mother, chose a non-Indian couple, Nick and Heather Libretti, to adopt her newborn, Baby O.
- Baby O. was enrolled as a member by the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo Tribe based on her biological father's ancestry, and the Tribe intervened to oppose the Librettis' adoption, seeking to place the child on its reservation.
- Child P., whose maternal grandmother is a member of the White Earth Band of Ojibwe Tribe, was placed in foster care with a non-Indian couple, Jason and Danielle Clifford.
- The Tribe initially informed the state court that Child P. was not eligible for membership, but reversed its position after the Cliffords sought to adopt her.
- The Tribe then enrolled Child P., intervened in the proceeding, and the state placed the child with her maternal grandmother, who had previously lost her foster license due to a criminal conviction.
Procedural Posture:
- Individual families and the State of Texas sued the United States and federal agencies in a U.S. District Court, challenging the constitutionality of ICWA.
- Several Indian Tribes intervened to defend the law.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that ICWA was unconstitutional.
- The federal parties and intervening Tribes appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
- A divided three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment.
- The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacating the panel opinion.
- The en banc Fifth Circuit issued a fractured decision, affirming in part and reversing in part, which found some ICWA provisions unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment and was evenly divided on others, thereby affirming the district court's invalidation of those provisions.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on cross-petitions filed by the families and Texas, the federal government, and the Tribes.
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Issue:
Does the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) exceed Congress's Article I powers or violate the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering principle by imposing requirements on state courts and agencies in child custody proceedings involving Indian children?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Barrett
No. The Indian Child Welfare Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress's broad powers over Indian affairs and does not violate the Tenth Amendment. Congress's authority to legislate with respect to Indians is plenary and well-established, stemming from sources including the Indian Commerce Clause and the Constitution's structure, and this power allows it to regulate matters that intersect with traditional state functions like family law. The challenged provisions do not violate the anticommandeering doctrine because they either apply evenhandedly to state and private parties, permissibly require state courts to apply federal law under the Supremacy Clause, or impose ancillary recordkeeping duties consistent with historical practice. The Court does not decide the petitioners' equal protection or nondelegation challenges because no party has standing to raise them.
Concurring - Justice Gorsuch
Justice Gorsuch concurred, detailing the history of forced removal of Indian children from their families by federal and state governments, which he described as an existential threat to tribal vitality. He argued that ICWA was a direct and constitutional response to this history, falling squarely within Congress's power under the Indian Commerce Clause, which he interprets broadly to regulate all interactions between non-Indians and Indians to preserve tribal sovereignty. He views the decision as a step toward restoring the Constitution's original balance of federal, state, and tribal powers and correcting the judicial error of the 'plenary power' doctrine's overreach.
Concurring - Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Kavanaugh concurred to emphasize that while he joined the Court's opinion in full, the decision does not resolve the serious equal protection questions raised by ICWA's use of racial classifications in foster care and adoption placements. He stated that these significant constitutional issues remain open and can be addressed in a future case brought by a plaintiff with proper standing, such as a prospective parent or child in a state-court proceeding.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that ICWA is unconstitutional because the Federal Government lacks the enumerated power to regulate state-court child custody proceedings. He contended that the Indian Commerce Clause is limited to commerce, not family law; the Treaty Clause is inapplicable; and foreign-affairs powers do not extend to domestic matters. He critiqued the Court's 'plenary power' doctrine as having no basis in the Constitution's text or original meaning and argued that even under existing precedent, federal power has been confined to tribal lands and governments, not the off-reservation activities of Indian citizens.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
Justice Alito dissented, arguing that ICWA exceeds congressional authority by violating the fundamental constitutional principle of dual sovereignty. He asserted that family law, including child custody, is a core function reserved to the States, with the 'best interests of the child' as the paramount concern. In his view, ICWA unconstitutionally displaces this state authority by subordinating a child's best interests to a tribe's interest in its membership, thereby sacrificing the well-being of vulnerable children and exceeding any power Congress possesses over Indian affairs.
Analysis:
This decision strongly reaffirms the breadth of Congress's power over Indian affairs, upholding federal intervention in an area of traditional state control—family law. The Court's narrow interpretation of the anticommandeering doctrine blesses generally applicable federal laws that impose duties on both state and private actors, and confirms Congress's power to assign ancillary adjudicative tasks to state courts. However, by dismissing the equal protection and nondelegation claims on standing grounds, the Court deliberately leaves the most contentious aspects of ICWA—its placement preferences—unresolved, ensuring that litigation over the statute's constitutionality will continue in state courts.
