Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court of United States
484 U.S. 49 (1987)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, which authorizes citizen suits against any person 'alleged to be in violation' of the Act, does not confer federal jurisdiction over suits for wholly past violations.

Facts:

The Virginia State Water Control Board issued a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to ITT-Gwaltney for its meatpacking plant in Smithfield, Virginia, establishing effluent limitations.
In 1981, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. (Gwaltney) acquired the plant and assumed the obligations under the permit.
Between 1981 and 1984, Gwaltney repeatedly and chronically violated the permit's conditions by exceeding limitations on pollutants such as fecal coliform, chlorine, and total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN).
Gwaltney installed new equipment to improve its chlorination system in March 1982, and its last reported chlorine violation was in October 1982.
Gwaltney installed an upgraded wastewater treatment system in October 1983.
The company's last reported fecal coliform violation occurred in February 1984, and its last reported TKN violation occurred on May 15, 1984.
In February 1984, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the Natural Resources Defense Council sent Gwaltney a notice of intent to sue for its violations.

Procedural Posture:

Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Natural Resources Defense Council (respondents) filed a citizen suit against Gwaltney of Smithfield (petitioner) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in June 1984.
The District Court granted partial summary judgment for the respondents.
Gwaltney moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that its last violation occurred before the respondents filed their complaint.
The District Court denied the motion, holding that the Clean Water Act authorizes suits based on wholly past violations.
Gwaltney appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that § 505 allows suits for wholly past violations.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts on this issue.

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Issue:

Does § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, which authorizes citizen suits against any person 'alleged to be in violation' of the Act, confer federal jurisdiction over suits for wholly past violations?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Marshall

No. Section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act does not confer federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations. The most natural reading of the statutory language 'to be in violation' is a present-tense requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent violation. The structure of the Act supports this, particularly the 60-day notice provision, which gives the alleged violator an opportunity to achieve compliance and render a suit unnecessary, an objective that would be meaningless for past violations. Furthermore, the legislative history indicates that citizen suits are meant to supplement, not supplant, government enforcement; allowing suits for past violations could intrude upon prosecutorial discretion. Jurisdiction attaches, however, if the plaintiff makes a good-faith allegation of a continuous or intermittent violation, and the case should be remanded to determine if such an allegation was made.

Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Scalia

Yes, I agree that the Act does not permit suits for wholly past violations, but the majority's jurisdictional test is flawed. The statute's requirement that a defendant be 'alleged to be in violation' pertains only to the commencement of a suit, not the maintenance of jurisdiction throughout the litigation. If the jurisdictional facts are challenged, a plaintiff must prove, not merely allege in good faith, that the defendant was in fact 'in violation' at the time the suit was brought. A company remains 'in violation' until it has implemented remedial measures that clearly eliminate the cause of the past violations. Even under the majority’s theory, the plaintiffs would still need to prove an ongoing violation to establish Article III standing, which requires a remediable injury-in-fact.

Analysis:

This decision significantly narrows the scope of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision by precluding actions for purely historical violations. It solidifies the role of citizen suits as a forward-looking tool to abate ongoing pollution, rather than a mechanism for private citizens to seek penalties for past conduct. The Court's holding preserves the primary enforcement authority and discretion of government agencies like the EPA. By establishing a 'good-faith allegation' standard for jurisdiction, the Court creates a relatively low bar for initiating a suit but ensures through mootness doctrine that cases cannot proceed if a defendant can prove the violations have ceased and will not recur.

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