Guy v. Baltimore
1879 U.S. LEXIS 1837, 100 U.S. 434, 25 L. Ed. 743 (1880)
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Rule of Law:
A state or its municipal agency cannot, consistent with the Federal Constitution, impose more onerous public burdens or taxes, such as wharfage fees, on products of other states (or on citizens engaged in their sale or transportation) than it imposes on similar products of its own territory, as such discrimination violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Facts:
- In 1827, the General Assembly of Maryland authorized the mayor and city council of Baltimore to charge wharfage fees for vessels using its public wharves, specifically exempting goods that were "the products of that State."
- In 1858, the city of Baltimore, by its constituted authorities, passed an ordinance regulating public wharves, declaring that all goods landed on public wharves from vessels, or placed thereon for shipment or sale, "other than the product of the State of Maryland," shall pay wharfage according to prescribed rates.
- In 1876, Guy, a resident citizen of Accomac County, Virginia, sailed his schooner, of which he was master and part-owner, from Virginia to Baltimore, laden with potatoes raised in Virginia.
- In June 1876, Guy landed his vessel at one of the public wharves belonging to the city and discharged two hundred and twenty barrels of potatoes.
- The city harbor-master demanded payment of $4.40 from Guy as wharfage, based on the Maryland statute and Baltimore ordinance.
- Wharfage dues were not, and had never been, assessed against parties or vessels bringing to that port potatoes or other articles grown in the State of Maryland.
Procedural Posture:
- The city of Baltimore sued Guy in a court of a justice of the peace to collect the demanded wharfage fees.
- Judgment was rendered against Guy in the court of a justice of the peace.
- Guy appealed this judgment to the City Court of Baltimore, which was identified as the highest court of Maryland in which a decision of the case could have been had.
- The City Court of Baltimore affirmed the judgment against Guy.
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Issue:
Does a city ordinance that imposes wharfage fees on vessels landing goods from other states, but exempts vessels landing goods produced within the state, violate the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Harlan
Yes, a city ordinance that imposes wharfage fees on vessels landing goods from other states, but exempts vessels landing goods produced within the state, violates the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, reiterated the settled principle that no state can, consistent with the Federal Constitution, impose more onerous public burdens or taxes upon the products of other states, or upon citizens engaged in their trade, than it imposes upon the like products of its own territory. This principle, derived from precedents like Woodruff v. Parham, Hinson v. Lott, Ward v. Maryland, and Welton v. State of Missouri, ensures that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is not annulled and that commercial privileges are equal among citizens of the several states. The Court reasoned that while Baltimore, as owner of the wharves, could charge reasonable, non-discriminatory fees for their use, it could not use this proprietary interest to hinder, obstruct, or burden interstate commerce in favor of its internal commerce. The differential wharfage fees, though termed compensation, were considered a "mere expedient or device" to accomplish indirectly what the state could not do directly: build up its domestic commerce through unequal and oppressive burdens on other states' industries. Such exactions are, in effect, taxation upon interstate commerce, which the Constitution forbids.
Dissenting - Waite
No, a city ordinance imposing wharfage fees on vessels landing goods from other states, while exempting state-produced goods, does not violate the Constitution if the fees are reasonable compensation for wharf use, as the state merely chose to prohibit charges for its own products. Chief Justice Waite dissented, arguing that a municipal corporation is permitted to collect reasonable compensation for the use of its improved public wharves and landing-places. He contended that such a charge is not a "tax or burden" in the constitutional sense. In his view, the State of Maryland simply chose to prohibit the city of Baltimore from making such charges for landing and depositing its own products. He concluded that the U.S. Constitution does not mandate that all wharfage at the city's public wharves must be free for out-of-state products merely because the existing law exempts in-state products.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the principle of non-discrimination against interstate commerce, extending it to indirect burdens like wharfage fees imposed by municipalities. It clarifies that states cannot grant their political subdivisions the power to enact regulations that achieve indirectly what the state itself cannot do directly. The decision underscores the importance of a uniform national commercial system and prevents states from using proprietary ownership of public facilities as a pretext for protectionist economic policies, thereby strengthening federal power under the Commerce Clause.
