Gustafson v. Benda
661 S.W.2d 11 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
The common law doctrine of contributory negligence, which completely bars a plaintiff's recovery if they are found to be at fault in any degree, is abolished. It is replaced by a system of pure comparative fault, where a plaintiff's recovery is reduced by their percentage of fault but is not barred entirely.
Facts:
- Gustafson was operating a motorcycle.
- Benda was driving an automobile in front of Gustafson.
- Both parties were approaching a 'T' intersection.
- Gustafson began to pass Benda's automobile.
- As Gustafson was passing, Benda turned her automobile to the left, causing a collision.
Procedural Posture:
- Gustafson sued Benda in a Missouri trial court seeking damages for negligence.
- Following a trial, Benda, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals issued an opinion but then transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Missouri for reexamination of the state's humanitarian doctrine.
- The Supreme Court of Missouri accepted the transfer to review the case as if on original appeal.
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Issue:
Should the judicial doctrines of contributory negligence, last clear chance, and humanitarian negligence be abandoned and replaced with a comprehensive system of pure comparative fault?
Opinions:
Majority - Welliver, J.
Yes. The doctrines of contributory negligence, last clear chance, and humanitarian negligence are supplanted with a comprehensive system of pure comparative fault. The court reasoned that the 'all-or-nothing' contributory negligence rule was harsh and unjust. While doctrines like 'last clear chance' attempted to mitigate this harshness, they were a 'floundering, haphazard, make-shift device' that unfairly shifted the entire loss to one party. A system of pure comparative fault, as outlined in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, is a more fair and just approach that apportions damages based on each party's percentage of fault. After waiting over five years for the legislature to act on this issue, the court exercised its inherent power to evolve the common law to better serve justice.
Concurring - Billings, J.
Yes. A system of pure comparative fault is more equitable and just than the 'ancient and harsh' rule of contributory negligence and the 'mathematical gymnastics' of the last clear chance and humanitarian doctrines. The concurring opinion argues that since these old doctrines were created by judicial decisions, it is appropriate for the court to abolish them by judicial decision as well.
Dissenting - Rendlen, C.J.
No. The adoption of comparative negligence is a complex policy decision that should be made by the legislature, not the judiciary. The Court had previously deferred to the legislature on this issue in cases like Epple and Steinman. The Missouri General Assembly has considered and rejected comparative negligence bills on at least twelve occasions, demonstrating a clear legislative intent to retain the existing tort system. The majority's decision constitutes 'a giant legislative enactment by judicial fiat' that will create massive uncertainty and instability in Missouri's tort law.
Dissenting - Gunn, J.
No. The dissent presents two main arguments. First, imposing such a fundamental change in law is a legislative function, and the court's action violates the principle of separation of powers. Second, even under existing law, the plaintiff had a submissible case under the last clear chance doctrine, and the court should have resolved the case on those grounds rather than completely overhauling the state's tort system. The dissent argues for maintaining the distinction between the last clear chance and humanitarian doctrines, which McClanahan blurred.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally altered Missouri tort law by replacing the harsh, all-or-nothing contributory negligence regime with a more equitable system of pure comparative fault. The ruling eliminated the complete defense of contributory negligence and its complex exceptions like the last clear chance doctrine. By adopting the 'pure' form, the court allowed plaintiffs to recover damages even if they are found to be 99% at fault, with their award simply reduced by that percentage. This case significantly impacts litigation strategy, as cases that would have been barred previously could now proceed to trial, shifting the focus from whether a plaintiff was at fault to determining the respective percentages of fault for all parties.
