Gunter v. Pogue
672 S.W.2d 840, 1984 Tex. App. LEXIS 5445 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
In Texas, a party seeking to avoid a forfeiture clause in a will by asserting the 'good faith and probable cause' exception bears the burden of proving that their contest was made in good faith and upon probable cause for the specific will admitted to probate. Without such a finding, a valid forfeiture clause must be enforced.
Facts:
- Eldon Johnson died testate in November 1979, having been predeceased by his spouse and having no children of his own, but eleven stepchildren.
- During his later years, Johnson lived with and was cared for by his stepdaughter, Beryl Gunter, and her husband, Gerald Gunter.
- During the three years before his death, Johnson executed four wills: Will One (January 14, 1977), Will Two (July 8, 1977), Will Three (March 2, 1978), and Will Four (November 9, 1978).
- The bequests in each will differed, but one or both of the Gunters were named as executors in all four wills, and Wills Number Two, Three, and Four contained forfeiture clauses.
- The forfeiture clause stated that any person contesting the will would receive only $10.00 instead of their designated portion.
- The bequests in Will Number Two were similar to Will Number One, with Jo Ann Pogue, William Otten, and Beryl Katchmazenski (appellees) receiving shares equal to other stepchildren.
Procedural Posture:
- Gerald and Beryl Gunter offered Will Number Four for probate.
- Jo Ann Pogue, William Otten, and Beryl Katchmazenski (appellees) filed a will contest and offered Will Number One for probate, claiming Johnson lacked mental capacity and was unduly influenced when executing Will Four.
- The Gunters (appellants) opposed probate of Will One and offered, alternatively, Wills Number Three and Two.
- A jury found that Eldon Johnson lacked testamentary capacity and was unduly influenced when executing Will Number Four.
- The jury found that Will Number Three was improperly witnessed and signed.
- The jury found that Eldon Johnson signed Will Number Two, and it had not been executed as a result of any undue influence or mental incapacity.
- Will Number Two (the July 1977 will) was admitted to probate as Eldon Johnson’s Last Will and Testament.
- The Gunters filed a judgment N.O.V. and a Motion for New Trial, but neither party appealed that judgment.
- Appellants were appointed co-independent executors of Will Number Two.
- On June 11, 1982, the Gunters mailed letters to appellees, informing them that, under the forfeiture clause in Will Number Two, they were to receive only $10.00 because they had contested the will.
- Appellees filed a motion in the probate court to remove the Gunters as Executors and, alternatively, a motion to compel the Gunters to distribute the assets of the estate to the beneficiaries, disregarding the forfeiture provision.
- The trial court ordered the Gunters to distribute the property and assets of the estate to the beneficiaries of the will, including the appellees, disregarding the forfeiture clause.
- The Gunters appealed the trial court’s order to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi (appellants here).
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Issue:
Does a will's forfeiture clause apply to beneficiaries who contested an earlier will, even if their contest was found to have been in good faith, where the will ultimately admitted to probate also contains a forfeiture clause, and no finding of good faith and probable cause was secured for the contest of the probated will?
Opinions:
Majority - NYE, Chief Justice
Yes, a will's forfeiture clause applies to beneficiaries who contested an earlier will if the will ultimately admitted to probate also contains a forfeiture clause, and the beneficiaries failed to secure a finding that their contest of the probated will was brought in good faith and upon probable cause. The court acknowledged that Texas courts have "touched peripherally" on the good faith and probable cause exception, suggesting Texas "would and probably should" adopt it, but found it unnecessary to make a definitive ruling in this case. Instead, the court emphasized that if the appellees sought to defeat the no-contest provision, they had the clear burden to show that their will contest was brought in good faith and upon probable cause, specifically regarding Will Number Two, which was ultimately admitted to probate. The trial court refused to make a finding on this controlling issue despite being specifically requested to do so by the appellants. Furthermore, the record contained no evidence to support a finding that the contest of Will Number Two was brought in good faith and upon probable cause; rather, evidence indicated the testator was competent when Will Two was executed. Without a proper finding establishing good faith and probable cause for contesting the probated will, the forfeiture clause must be enforced, as the executors have a duty to carry out the express terms of the testator’s will.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the procedural and evidentiary requirements for challenging a will's no-contest clause in Texas. By firmly placing the burden of proof on the contestant to establish both good faith and probable cause, particularly for the will ultimately probated, the ruling provides a strong incentive for challengers to carefully consider the merits of their claims against each specific testamentary instrument. It reinforces the principle of testamentary freedom and ensures that forfeiture clauses, if valid, are given effect unless a specific, well-substantiated legal exception is proven. Future litigants must understand that merely prevailing in a contest against one will does not automatically shield them from a no-contest clause in another will that is ultimately validated.
