Gundy v. United States
204 L. Ed. 2d 522, 139 S.Ct. 2116 (2019)
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Rule of Law:
A congressional delegation of authority is constitutionally permissible so long as Congress lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform.
Facts:
- In 2005, Herman Gundy pleaded guilty to a sexual offense.
- In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which established detailed registration requirements for individuals convicted of sex offenses after its passage.
- For the more than 500,000 individuals convicted before its passage ('pre-Act offenders'), SORNA granted the U.S. Attorney General the authority 'to specify the applicability of the requirements... and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offender.'
- Over the next several years, different Attorneys General issued varying rules and guidelines regarding the registration of pre-Act offenders.
- After his release from prison in 2010, Herman Gundy was required to register as a sex offender under the rules the Attorney General had prescribed for pre-Act offenders.
- Gundy failed to register in accordance with the Attorney General's rules and was subsequently arrested for this failure.
Procedural Posture:
- Herman Gundy was prosecuted by the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for failing to register as a sex offender.
- Gundy moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that SORNA unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Attorney General.
- The district court (a court of first instance) denied the motion, and Gundy was convicted.
- Gundy, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals (an intermediate appellate court) affirmed the conviction, holding that the delegation was constitutional.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) violate the nondelegation doctrine by granting the Attorney General the authority to specify the applicability of its registration requirements to offenders convicted before the statute's enactment?
Opinions:
Concurring - Justice Alito
No. While the statutory provision at issue pushes the boundaries of permissible delegation, it does not violate the nondelegation doctrine under the Court's current precedent. Although the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments for over 80 years, I would support an effort to reconsider this approach in a future case. However, because a majority of the Court is not willing to do so in this case, it would be 'freakish' to single out this one statute. Therefore, I concur in the judgment to affirm because the statute does not lack a discernable standard that is adequate under the Court's long-standing approach.
Dissenting - Justice Gorsuch
Yes. SORNA unconstitutionally delegates core legislative power to the Attorney General in violation of the separation of powers. The Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, which cannot be transferred to another branch. SORNA gives the Attorney General unfettered discretion to decide whether, when, and how to apply registration requirements to a half-million pre-Act offenders, which amounts to giving the executive a 'blank check' to write criminal law. This is not merely 'filling up the details' or engaging in fact-finding; it is making fundamental policy choices that Congress itself was unable to resolve. The plurality's attempt to save the statute by inventing a 'feasibility' standard finds no basis in the statutory text and contradicts the executive branch's own interpretation of its authority. Such a vast delegation of power to the nation's chief prosecutor threatens liberty and undermines the principles of accountability, deliberation, and fair notice that the separation of powers is designed to protect.
Analysis:
This case is significant for its revival of the nondelegation doctrine as a subject of serious judicial debate. Although the statute was upheld, the 4-1-3 split, with Justice Alito's pivotal concurrence, signaled that a majority of the Court may be willing to reconsider and potentially strengthen the doctrine in the future. The dissent's forceful argument against the modern, permissive 'intelligible principle' test puts the administrative state on notice that broad, standardless delegations of authority may face renewed constitutional scrutiny. The decision thus sets the stage for future challenges that could potentially reshape the balance of power between Congress and executive agencies.
