Guillory v. Godfrey
1955 Cal. App. LEXIS 1815, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Malicious interference with the right to pursue a lawful business constitutes a tort for which damages, including compensation for aggravated pre-existing conditions, mental suffering, and punitive damages based on actual malice, may be awarded.
Facts:
- Dorothy and Preston R. Guillory owned and operated a café at 715 ½ South Main Street in Los Angeles.
- Defendant Froy J. Tristany operated Duke’s Liquor Stores next door to the Guillorys' café, and his sister, defendant Mildred Godfrey, was active in the liquor store's operations.
- On March 17, 1952, the Guillorys hired William Murrell, a Black cook, to work in their café.
- From March 17, 1952, until about April 28, 1952, Mildred Godfrey and Froy J. Tristany engaged in a continuous course of conduct to intimidate the Guillorys' customers and drive away their trade.
- Mildred Godfrey would ask customers if they were 'Nigger Lovers,' make disparaging remarks about the café and food 'cooked by a nigger,' perform antics, make obscene gestures, and yell things like 'Don’t go in there. The place isn’t fit to eat in.'
- On March 24, 1952, Mildred Godfrey entered the café, called a customer a 'nigger lover,' and forcibly evicted him by dragging him out and beating him until he bled.
- Froy J. Tristany actively participated by standing on the sidewalk, joining in gestures, laughing at Mildred's antics, making disparaging remarks, and openly stating his 100% support for her actions.
- As a direct result of the defendants' malicious acts, the café's business dropped off completely, and Dorothy Guillory's existing gall bladder trouble was aggravated, leading to a complete nervous breakdown.
- The Guillorys were ultimately unable to sell or operate the cafe.
Procedural Posture:
- Dorothy and Preston R. Guillory (plaintiffs) filed an action in a trial court for recovery of damages for malicious interference with their restaurant business against Mildred Godfrey and Froy J. Tristany (defendants).
- A general demurrer filed by defendants was overruled with leave to answer, but defendants instead filed a special demurrer, which was sustained.
- Defendants subsequently answered the original complaint.
- A jury in the trial court found in favor of the Guillorys and awarded them $2,250 in compensatory damages and $2,000 in punitive damages.
- Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict.
- Defendants Mildred Godfrey and Froy J. Tristany (appellants) appealed from the judgment.
- Defendants also made a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied by the trial court.
- Defendants also made a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does wrongful and malicious interference with a lawful business, through intimidation and harassment of customers, constitute a tort for which a defendant is liable for business losses, mental suffering, aggravation of pre-existing physical conditions, and punitive damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Ashburn, J. pro tem.
Yes, wrongful and malicious interference with a lawful business through intimidation and harassment of customers constitutes a tort, making the defendant liable for business losses, mental suffering, aggravation of pre-existing physical conditions, and punitive damages. The court affirmed that the tort of wrongful or malicious interference with the right to pursue a lawful business prevails in California, citing precedents such as Finney v. Lockhart and the Restatement of Torts. The evidence amply supported a finding of malicious disruption and proximate damage. The court reiterated the principle that a tort-feasor must 'take his victim as he finds him,' meaning liability extends to the aggravation of an existing disability, and the jury's role is to measure this in damages. Furthermore, it affirmed that damages for mental suffering caused by intentional and outrageous conduct are recoverable, citing Emden v. Vitz and State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznof. Defendant Tristany was found equally liable due to his active participation in concert with Godfrey and his wholehearted endorsement of her conduct and objectives, consistent with Marriott v. Williams. The court concluded that actual malice, which was plainly proved, is the basis for punitive damages, and the punitive award was not excessive.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the breadth of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage or business relations, establishing that such interference does not require a breach of contract but can arise from acts of intimidation and harassment. It underscores the 'eggshell skull' rule, holding tortfeasors fully accountable for the aggravation of pre-existing conditions, and affirms that mental suffering from intentional, outrageous conduct is compensable. The case also clarifies that active participation and endorsement of malicious conduct by co-defendants can lead to joint liability for both compensatory and punitive damages, setting a strong precedent for protecting businesses from discriminatory and malicious interference.
