Guardians Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City
77 L. Ed. 2d 866, 1983 U.S. LEXIS 101, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983)
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Rule of Law:
A violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be established by proof of discriminatory effect without proof of discriminatory intent, based on implementing agency regulations. However, in a private action for such unintentional violations, the available remedies are limited to declaratory and injunctive relief, and do not include compensatory relief such as backpay or retroactive seniority.
Facts:
- Between 1968 and 1970, the New York City Police Department administered several written examinations for entry-level officer appointments.
- The examinations had a statistically significant disparate impact on the test scores and pass rates of black and Hispanic applicants compared to white applicants.
- The plaintiffs, a class of black and Hispanic officers represented by the Guardians Association, passed these examinations but received lower scores than similarly situated white candidates.
- Because the Department made appointments in rank-order based on test scores, the plaintiff officers were hired later than they would have been absent the exams' discriminatory impact.
- This delay in hiring resulted in the plaintiff officers having less seniority, which affected their benefits and job security.
- In June 1975, the Department conducted massive layoffs based on a 'last-hired, first-fired' seniority system.
- As a direct result of their lower seniority, the black and Hispanic officers in the plaintiff class were disproportionately laid off.
Procedural Posture:
- The Guardians Association and other representatives of black and Hispanic police officers filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York City Police Department.
- The District Court initially found for the plaintiffs under Title VII, concluding the exams had a disparate impact, and granted a preliminary injunction without ruling on the Title VI claim.
- On appeal by the city, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of an intervening Supreme Court case.
- On remand, the District Court concluded that Title VII relief was limited and turned to the Title VI claim. It held that discriminatory effect was sufficient to establish a Title VI violation and awarded the plaintiff class 'make-whole' relief, including constructive seniority.
- The city appealed again to the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit reversed the Title VI judgment, holding in a fractured decision that Title VI requires proof of discriminatory intent and, alternatively, that compensatory remedies are not available under Title VI.
- The plaintiffs (The Guardians Association et al.) petitioned for, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted, a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a private plaintiff need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and be entitled to compensatory relief?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No, a private plaintiff does not need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI, but is not entitled to compensatory relief for such unintentional violations. A majority of the Court concludes that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring proof of intent, upholding administrative regulations that prohibit practices with a discriminatory effect. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's prior holding in Lau v. Nichols and the long-standing interpretation by agencies charged with enforcing Title VI. However, Title VI is Spending Clause legislation, and remedies for its violation should respect the recipient's choice to either comply with the conditions or forgo federal funds. In cases of unintentional discrimination, where the recipient may not have known it was in violation, relief should be limited to declaratory and prospective injunctive orders, not compensatory 'make-whole' remedies like backpay or retroactive seniority, which are retrospective in nature.
Concurring - Justice Powell
Yes, a private plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI. The Court's decision in University of California Regents v. Bakke established that Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause, which requires a showing of purposeful discrimination. Furthermore, Congress did not intend to create any private right of action under Title VI, having provided a comprehensive administrative enforcement scheme centered on the termination of federal funds. Therefore, the action should be dismissed both for failure to prove intent and because no private right of action exists.
Concurring - Justice Rehnquist
Yes, a private plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent. This opinion joins Justice Powell's conclusion that Title VI requires a showing of intentional discrimination. It also joins Justice White's conclusion that, even if a violation could be shown by disparate impact, compensatory relief is not an available remedy.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
Yes, a private plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI. Stare decisis requires adherence to the holding in Bakke that Title VI's scope is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause, which requires proof of purposeful discrimination. If the statute itself only proscribes intentional discrimination, administrative agencies exceed their authority by issuing regulations that prohibit conduct with only a discriminatory effect. Such regulations are inconsistent with the statute and therefore invalid.
Dissenting - Justice Marshall
No, a private plaintiff does not need to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI, and should be entitled to compensatory relief. The long-standing, consistent administrative interpretation of Title VI to prohibit practices with a discriminatory effect is reasonable and entitled to deference. Denying compensatory relief to victims of discrimination frustrates the purpose of Title VI, as a right without an effective remedy has little meaning. The 'contractual' nature of Spending Clause legislation supports, rather than defeats, the availability of make-whole relief to enforce the recipient's promise not to discriminate.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No, while the Title VI statute itself requires proof of discriminatory intent per Bakke, a violation of federal law can be established without proving intent, and full relief should be available. Federal agency regulations that prohibit practices with a discriminatory effect are a valid exercise of their authority to implement Title VI. These regulations have the force of law, and a violation of them is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides for a full range of remedies, including damages. Therefore, the plaintiffs established a violation of valid federal regulations and are entitled to the compensatory relief awarded by the District Court.
Analysis:
This fractured decision establishes a unique and somewhat paradoxical framework for Title VI litigation. By upholding disparate impact claims based on agency regulations while simultaneously barring compensatory damages for those same claims, the Court created a right with a limited remedy. The decision solidifies the viability of 'effects test' litigation under Title VI but significantly reduces the financial exposure for recipients of federal funds who engage in unintentional discrimination. This outcome forces plaintiffs to choose between seeking easier-to-prove disparate impact claims for only prospective relief or undertaking the more difficult task of proving intentional discrimination to obtain compensatory damages.
