Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co.
63 Ohio St.3d 756, 591 N.E.2d 696 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A pharmaceutical company's liability for manufacturing a defective prescription drug does not extend to a third-generation plaintiff who was never exposed to the drug, either directly or in utero, as such an injury is too remote in time and causation to establish a legal duty.
Facts:
- During her pregnancy in 1952-1953, Charles Grover's grandmother ingested the prescription drug Diethylstilbestrol (DES) to prevent miscarriage.
- As a result of this in utero exposure, the grandmother's daughter, Candy Grover, was born with defects in her reproductive system, including an incompetent cervix.
- Years later, Candy Grover became pregnant with her son, Charles Grover.
- Due to Candy Grover's DES-induced incompetent cervix, Charles Grover was born prematurely and suffered severe birth defects, including cerebral palsy.
Procedural Posture:
- The underlying lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.
- The U.S. District Court certified a question of Ohio state law to the Supreme Court of Ohio for determination.
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Issue:
Does Ohio law recognize a cause of action on behalf of a child born with severe birth defects proximately caused by defects in the child's mother's reproductive system, where those defects were in turn proximately caused by the child's grandmother ingesting a defective drug (DES) during her pregnancy with the mother?
Opinions:
Majority - Wright, J.
No. A pharmaceutical company’s liability for the distribution or manufacture of a defective prescription drug does not extend to persons who were never exposed to the drug, either directly or in utero. The court holds that because of the remoteness in time and causation, the drug manufacturer does not owe a legal duty to a third-generation child. Relying on the reasoning of Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co., the court determined that such a child is not within the manufacturer's 'range of apprehension,' meaning the risk of harm was not reasonably foreseeable. The court reasoned that public policy requires confining liability within manageable limits, and extending it to subsequent generations would create staggering implications and potentially infinite liability. Therefore, liability is limited to those who ingested the drug or were exposed to it in utero.
Dissenting - Resnick, J.
Yes. The dissent argues that a cause of action should be recognized because the harm to the grandchild was a foreseeable consequence of the manufacturer's actions. The dissent contends that if manufacturers knew or should have known in the 1940s that DES caused reproductive abnormalities in a developing female fetus, it was also foreseeable that this fetus would mature and that her defective reproductive system could cause injury to her own child during pregnancy. It criticizes the majority's reliance on 'floodgates of litigation' arguments as an unpersuasive reason to deny a remedy for a cognizable wrong. The dissent concludes that the majority created an arbitrary 'blanket no-duty rule' and ignored the direct causal connection which the certified question required the court to assume.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a bright-line rule in Ohio preventing tort liability from extending to third-generation victims of defective products, specifically in the context of preconception torts. By prioritizing foreseeability and the public policy of containing liability, the court makes it a matter of law that no duty is owed to plaintiffs who were not directly exposed to the harmful substance. This holding effectively shields manufacturers from what the court perceives as limitless liability across generations and places a firm boundary on the scope of duty in product liability cases involving latent, multi-generational harm.
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