Grotts v. Zahner
989 P.2d 415 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
To have standing for a bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim, the plaintiff must be 'closely related' to the victim, a standard which is satisfied only by a relationship of blood or marriage. An affianced relationship, such as being a fiancé, does not meet this requirement as a matter of law.
Facts:
- Kellie Grotts and her fiancé were involved in a vehicle accident with Gertrude Zahner.
- Grotts's fiancé sustained fatal injuries as a result of the accident.
- Grotts was present at the scene and witnessed the accident and the fatal injuries to her fiancé.
- At the time of the accident, Grotts and the victim were engaged to be married but were not legally married.
Procedural Posture:
- Kellie Grotts filed a lawsuit against Gertrude Zahner in a Nevada district court (trial court) seeking damages for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- The district court dismissed Grotts's claim on the grounds that she was not 'closely related' to her fiancé as a matter of law.
- Grotts, as appellant, appealed the district court's dismissal to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
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Issue:
Does the 'closely related' requirement for a bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress claim extend to a plaintiff who is engaged to, but not legally married to, the victim?
Opinions:
Majority - Maupin, J.
No. The 'closely related' requirement for bystander NIED claims is limited to relationships based on blood or marriage. The court establishes a bright-line rule where standing is determined based upon family membership to promote predictability. Immediate family members qualify as a matter of law, while the closeness of relationships for non-immediate family members is a question of fact. However, any non-family relationship, including that of a fiancé, fails to confer standing as a matter of law. This approach overturns the more flexible, fact-based inquiry from the plurality opinion in State, Department of Transportation v. Hill, creating an objective standard to prevent an expansion of liability to almost any type of close friendship.
Dissenting - Rose, C. J.
Yes. The court should not have departed from the recent precedent in Hill, which allowed the fact-finder to determine the closeness of a relationship on a case-by-case basis. The majority's rigid rule based on blood or marriage is unfair and arbitrary, as it excludes individuals in genuinely loving and committed relationships, such as fiancés, long-term unmarried partners, and same-sex partners, who may suffer profound emotional distress. The quality and intimacy of a relationship, not a legal document, should determine closeness, and juries are fully capable of making such a determination. This new rule denies legal redress to a segment of the population based on their lifestyle or legal status.
Dissenting - Shearing, J.
Yes. The question of whether a plaintiff is 'closely related' to a victim is a question of fact that should be determined by a jury. The court should follow the precedent of State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Hill, which allows the fact-finder to assess the nature and quality of the relationship. To exclude a fiancé from being considered a 'closely related person' as a matter of law puts the form of the relationship over its actual substance.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the scope for bystander NIED claims in Nevada by replacing a flexible, fact-sensitive standard with a rigid, bright-line rule. The court prioritizes legal predictability and limiting liability over a case-by-case assessment of the emotional reality of relationships. The ruling effectively forecloses claims by individuals in committed, non-marital relationships, such as fiancés or domestic partners, highlighting a judicial preference for formal legal relationships (marriage and blood ties) as the basis for recovery in tort law. This precedent makes it much more difficult for plaintiffs who are not legally or biologically related to a victim to succeed on such a claim.
