Gross v. Sweet
400 N.E.2d 306, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 49 N.Y.2d 102 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
An exculpatory agreement intended to release a party from liability for its own negligence is unenforceable unless the language of the agreement expresses this intent in clear and unequivocal terms.
Facts:
- Plaintiff Bruce Gross enrolled in the Stormville Parachute Center Training School, owned by defendant William Sweet, to learn how to parachute.
- As a prerequisite for admission, Gross was required to sign a form entitled 'Responsibility Release'.
- The release stated that Gross waived 'any and all claims...for any personal injuries...that I may sustain or which may arise out of my learning, practicing or actually jumping from an aircraft.'
- Gross informed Sweet that he had an orthopedic pin in his leg from a prior surgery.
- After receiving approximately one hour of on-land instruction, Gross was taken on a plane to an altitude of 2,800 feet.
- On his first parachute jump, Gross suffered serious personal injuries upon landing.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff Gross sued defendant Sweet in the New York Supreme Court, Special Term (the trial court).
- Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting the signed release as an affirmative defense.
- Plaintiff cross-moved to strike the affirmative defense.
- The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
- Plaintiff Gross, as appellant, appealed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (the intermediate appellate court).
- A divided Appellate Division reversed the trial court's order, reinstated the complaint, and granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the affirmative defense.
- The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York (the state's highest court) on a certified question.
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Issue:
Does a pre-injury release that waives 'any and all claims' for personal injuries sustained while learning to parachute, but does not explicitly mention negligence, bar a subsequent lawsuit for injuries allegedly caused by the instructor's negligence?
Opinions:
Majority - Fuchsberg, J.
No. The release does not bar the plaintiff's suit for negligence because it does not unequivocally express an intention to exempt the defendant from liability for his own negligence. The law disfavors contracts that exculpate a party from the consequences of their own negligence and subjects them to close judicial scrutiny. For such a clause to be enforced, its language must be clear, unambiguous, and understandable. While the word 'negligence' is not mandatory, words conveying a similar, unmistakable import must be present. The broad, sweeping language in this release, such as 'any and all claims,' is insufficient as it could reasonably be interpreted as only releasing the defendant from liability for injuries inherent to the dangerous sport that occur without the defendant's fault, rather than releasing him from injuries caused by his own carelessness. This strict standard of construction is appropriate for a release between a student and an instructor, unlike the more liberal standard applied to indemnification agreements between sophisticated commercial entities.
Dissenting - Jones, J.
Yes. The release is sufficient to bar a claim for ordinary negligence. The majority relies on an outdated, overly strict standard of construction that the court has since abandoned in favor of discerning the 'unmistakable intent of the parties.' The language of the release, waiving 'any and all claims' for 'any personal injuries,' is exceptionally broad. The only practical claims a participant could have against the school would be based on negligence; injuries occurring without any fault of the defendant would not give rise to a cause of action at all. Therefore, if the release is interpreted as not covering negligence claims, it becomes a meaningless and null document, releasing the defendant from nothing. The clear intent of such an all-encompassing waiver was to exonerate the defendants from the exact type of claims the plaintiff is now asserting.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces New York's strict standard for construing exculpatory clauses in consumer and recreational contexts, as distinct from commercial indemnification agreements. It establishes that broad, boilerplate language like 'any and all claims' is insufficient to release a party from liability for its own negligence. The ruling puts the onus on drafters of liability waivers to be explicitly clear, practically requiring the use of the word 'negligence' or language of the same import, to ensure enforceability. This precedent significantly impacts businesses offering instruction in high-risk activities by limiting their ability to contractually shield themselves from negligence lawsuits without very specific and conspicuous language.
