No. A company cannot deny a religious request just because it costs a little bit. To prove an 'undue hardship,' the company must show that the cost or disruption is 'substantial.' The Court explained that for nearly 50 years, lower courts had been using a very low standard based on a confusing line from an old case. This ruling corrects that mistake. The words 'undue hardship' in the law actually mean a significant difficulty or expense. Annoyance from coworkers isn't enough; the company must prove that helping the employee truly hurts its business operations.

No. This opinion agreed with the main decision, but stressed that the Court wasn't completely throwing out the old case, just fixing a long-standing misunderstanding of it. It also clarified that if problems for coworkers become so great that they genuinely disrupt how the business runs, that can count as a 'substantial' hardship for the company. The key is that the hardship must be significant, not just a small inconvenience or based on coworkers' prejudice.

Yes, the law does require employers to do more than just a tiny bit to help workers follow their religious practices. We're saying that employers have to show that helping a worker follow their religion would cause big, important costs or problems for the business, not just small ones. This means looking at things like how the business works, how big it is, and what exactly the worker is asking for.

It's not enough for a business to say 'it would be a little inconvenient' or 'other workers don't like it.' They have to show it would really mess up how the business runs or cost a lot of money. And they can't use the excuse that other workers don't like the religious practice - that doesn't count as a real problem.

Also, businesses have to really try to find a way to help the worker. They can't just look at one option and say 'nope, too hard.' They need to think about different ways they could make it work.

We're telling the lower courts to look at Groff's case again with these new rules in mind. They need to think carefully about whether the post office really showed that letting Groff have Sundays off would cause big problems, or if there were other ways they could have made it work.

I agree with the final decision because the law protects an employee’s right to observe their religion without forcing an employer to pay for every little extra cost. However, I want to point out that we must look at real, meaningful costs—those that really affect how a business runs—instead of just tiny expenses. This matters because, in my view, focusing too narrowly on one detail, like keeping existing work rules unchanged, might miss other big challenges that come with making an accommodation. In simple terms, while I support the outcome, I believe our test should consider the whole picture of how an accommodation impacts a business, because that is a fairer way to balance everyone’s interests.

No. To establish an 'undue hardship' under Title VII, an employer must show that the burden of granting a religious accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business, not merely a cost that is more than de minimis. The Court reasoned that the widely used 'de minimis' standard originated from a misreading of a single sentence in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, which was primarily a case about the special status of seniority systems. The ordinary meaning of 'undue hardship' implies a burden that is 'excessive' or 'unjustifiable,' far greater than a trifling cost. The Court clarified that impacts on coworkers are relevant only to the extent that they affect the conduct of the employer's business, and employee animosity toward religion cannot be considered a valid hardship.

No. The concurring opinion agrees that the 'de minimis' phrase from Hardison was loose language and that 'undue hardship' is the correct statutory standard. It emphasizes that this decision clarifies, rather than overrules, Hardison, respecting principles of stare decisis, particularly since Congress has had many opportunities to amend the statute and has not done so. The concurrence also underscores that because a business's conduct includes the management of its employees, undue hardship on coworkers can constitute an undue hardship on the conduct of the business, so long as it is not based on animus and rises to a substantial level.

Yes. The 'undue hardship' standard under Title VII requires more than just a de minimis cost to the employer. I hold that showing 'more than a de minimis cost,' as that phrase is used in common parlance, does not suffice to establish 'undue hardship' under Title VII. Our decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison cannot be reduced to just the 'de minimis cost' phrase. In describing an employer's 'undue hardship' defense, Hardison referred repeatedly to 'substantial' burdens, and that formulation better explains the decision. We therefore understand Hardison to mean that 'undue hardship' is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer's business. This interpretation comports with both Hardison and the ordinary meaning of 'undue hardship.'

The statutory term 'hardship' refers to something hard to bear and suggests something more severe than a mere burden. Adding the modifier 'undue' means that the requisite burden or adversity must rise to an 'excessive' or 'unjustifiable' level. Understood this way, 'undue hardship' means something very different from a burden that is merely more than de minimis, i.e., 'very small or trifling.'

Courts must apply this test to take into account all relevant factors in the case at hand, including the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size, and operating cost of an employer. Impacts on co-workers are relevant only to the extent those impacts go on to affect the conduct of the business. A court must analyze whether that further logical step is shown. Further, a hardship that is attributable to employee animosity to a particular religion, to religion in general, or to the very notion of accommodating religious practice, cannot be considered 'undue.' Bias or hostility to a religious practice or accommodation cannot supply a defense.

Title VII requires that an employer 'reasonably accommodate' an employee's practice of religion, not merely that it assess the reasonableness of a particular possible accommodation or accommodations. Faced with an accommodation request like Groff's, an employer must do more than conclude that forcing other employees to work overtime would constitute an undue hardship. Consideration of other options would also be necessary.

Having clarified the Title VII undue-hardship standard, we leave the context-specific application of that clarified standard to the lower courts in the first instance.

I join the judgment in this case because I agree that Title VII’s mandate to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance must not be reduced to a trivial cost threshold. I write separately to emphasize that Hardison’s reference to a cost that is ‘more than de minimis’ should be read in light of the broader statutory requirement that an employer’s burden be substantial in relation to its overall business operations. Unlike the majority opinion—which focuses primarily on preserving established seniority rights—I advocate for a more expansive inquiry that considers all relevant factors, including operational disruptions and administrative costs, because such an approach better reflects the ordinary meaning of ‘undue hardship.’ This distinction sets my concurrence apart from the majority, underscoring that while I agree with the outcome, the reasoning must fully account for the real challenges an employer faces when balancing religious accommodations with business imperatives.

Groff v. DeJoy

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