Grisham v. Van Soelen

Majority - Chief Justice Bacon

Yes, Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution provides a cognizable and justiciable remedy for egregious partisan gerrymandering claims, and the court adopts a three-part test for adjudication under intermediate scrutiny. The New Mexico Supreme Court exercised its power of superintending control to provide guidance on this matter of first impression, which implicates the constitutional right to vote and the Legislature's redistricting responsibility. The Court determined that this case cannot be resolved under the State v. Gomez interstitial analysis framework because the federal Equal Protection Clause's substantive scope regarding partisan gerrymandering is 'undetermined' by Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), rather than merely 'undeveloped.' Therefore, the Court relied solely on the New Mexico Constitution, emphasizing that its opinion is 'separately, adequately, and independently based upon the protections provided by the New Mexico Constitution.' The Court affirmed the paramount importance of the right to vote in New Mexico, reading Article II, Section 18 (Equal Protection) together with Article II, Sections 2 (Popular Sovereignty), 3 (Right of Self-Government), and 8 (Freedom of Elections) to evaluate an individual's right to vote. These state constitutional provisions, particularly Sections 2 and 3, have no federal analog and underscore the people's sovereignty. Vote dilution through egregious partisan gerrymandering can constitute constitutional harm because it infringes upon the fundamental right to vote, potentially leading to political entrenchment where elections are predetermined, thus violating the principles of free and open elections and popular sovereignty. Denying a judicial remedy for such harm would be an abdication of the judiciary's duty. Judicial review of partisan gerrymandering does not offend separation of powers, as the Court's role is to determine if legislative acts exceed constitutional authority, not to impose policy preferences. New Mexico's Equal Protection Clause is not coextensive with the federal Fourteenth Amendment in this context, as evidenced by Griego and Breen, and therefore, the lack of federal standards for justiciability does not preclude state judicial review. The federal political question doctrine is persuasive but not binding on New Mexico courts, and the state constitutional concerns outweigh prudential concerns. The Court adopted Justice Kagan's three-part test from her Rucho dissent: (1) plaintiffs must prove state officials' predominant purpose in drawing lines was to entrench their party by diluting rival votes; (2) plaintiffs must establish the lines in fact substantially diluted their votes; and (3) the State must provide a legitimate, non-partisan justification. This test fits within New Mexico's existing equal protection framework, serving to identify egregious gerrymanders that lead to political entrenchment. Intermediate scrutiny is the proper level of scrutiny, balancing the fundamental right to vote with the Legislature's constitutional responsibility for redistricting. Strict scrutiny's 'least restrictive means' analysis would be unreasonable given that some degree of partisan consideration is permissible. Intermediate scrutiny, with its 'less restrictive means' analysis and balancing of state interests against individual burdens, better aligns with the goal of invalidating only egregious gerrymanders. While all relevant evidence may be considered, plaintiffs must provide objective, district-specific evidence of packing or cracking and that the resultant vote dilution is substantial, such as comparisons of voter registration percentages.