Griggs v. Allegheny County
1962 U.S. LEXIS 2149, 7 L. Ed. 2d 585, 369 U.S. 84 (1962)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A public entity that owns and operates an airport is liable for a constitutional "taking" of an air easement when the necessary flight paths for takeoffs and landings render adjacent private property unusable, and must pay just compensation.
Facts:
- Allegheny County (respondent) owned and operated the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, designed for public use under the National Airport Plan.
- The county's master plan, approved by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (C.A.A.), established an approach area for the northeast runway that passed directly over Thomas Griggs' (petitioner's) home.
- Griggs' house was located 3,250 feet from the end of the runway.
- The approved glide path for this runway provided a clearance of only 11.36 feet between the bottom of the glide angle and Griggs' chimney.
- Airlines, as lessees of the county, regularly and frequently flew planes over Griggs' home at altitudes between 30 and 300 feet on takeoff and between 53 and 153 feet on landing.
- The noise from these low-flying planes was comparable to a 'riveting machine or steam hammer,' and the vibrations caused plaster to fall from the walls and ceilings.
- The constant flights made conversation impossible, disrupted sleep, and caused Griggs and his family to become nervous and distraught.
- The conditions rendered the property 'undesirable and unbearable for...residential use,' eventually forcing the family to move out.
Procedural Posture:
- Griggs initiated a proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania.
- The court appointed a Board of Viewers, which found that Allegheny County had taken an air easement over Griggs' property and awarded $12,690 in compensation.
- The Court of Common Pleas dismissed exceptions from both parties and affirmed the Board's report.
- Allegheny County, as appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the lower court's decision, holding that if a taking had occurred, Allegheny County was not the liable party.
- Griggs, as petitioner, sought and was granted a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a county that owns and operates an airport, which designs flight paths passing directly and at low altitudes over adjacent private property, effect a 'taking' of an air easement for which it must pay just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Douglas
Yes. A county that owns, promotes, and leases an airport has 'taken' an air easement requiring just compensation when the necessary flight paths for its runways pass so low over adjacent private property as to deprive the owner of the use and enjoyment of their land. The airport operator is responsible for acquiring the necessary easements for its operations, just as it is responsible for acquiring the land for the runways themselves. The Court reasoned that the County was the promoter, owner, and lessor of the airport; it decided where to build it and what runways it would need, subject to federal approval. This responsibility for air easements is analogous to the need to acquire land for the approaches to a bridge. The federal legislation for the National Airport Plan contemplated this responsibility by allowing federal funds to be used for the 'costs of acquiring...easements through or other interests in air space.' Because an airport is not operable without its approach areas, the County's failure to acquire the necessary air rights over Griggs' property constituted a taking for public use for which it must pay.
Dissenting - Justice Black
No. While a taking has occurred, it was effected by the United States, not by Allegheny County. The dissent agrees that the frequent, low overflights so interfered with the use of Griggs' property as to constitute a 'taking' under the precedent of United States v. Causby. However, the dissent argues that Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme for air commerce, declaring 'complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' and redefining 'navigable airspace' after Causby to explicitly include the 'airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft.' By doing so, the United States appropriated this airspace for public use. Since the federal government has already taken the necessary flight paths as a public highway, the local county should not be required to acquire them again. Imposing this significant financial burden on local airport operators frustrates the national transportation plan and inequitably saddles local communities with costs that should be borne by the nation as a whole.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that the operator of an airport, typically a local government entity, is the party liable for a constitutional taking when flight operations render adjacent property unusable. It rejects the argument that liability rests with the airlines or the federal government, which regulates the airspace. By placing the financial responsibility on the entity that promotes and builds the airport, the Court incentivized airport planners to consider and internalize the full costs of their projects, including the acquisition of necessary air easements. This precedent ensures property owners have a clear, local defendant to sue for just compensation and has had a profound impact on airport planning and zoning regulations nationwide.
