Griffith v. Kentucky
479 U.S. 314 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A new constitutional rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions must be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, that are pending on direct review or not yet final when the rule is announced.
Facts:
- In a Kentucky state court, prosecutor's used four of five peremptory challenges to strike four of the five prospective Black jurors from the venire for Randall Lamont Griffith's, a Black man's, trial.
- After all challenges and a random draw, no Black person remained on the jury that tried Griffith.
- In a separate federal case in Oklahoma, Willie Davis Brown, a Black man, was on trial for narcotics charges.
- During jury selection for Brown's trial, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike the only two remaining prospective Black jurors after four others had been excused for cause.
- While a second group of potential jurors was being assembled for Brown's trial, the prosecutor contacted the jury clerk and stated, 'We would like to have as few black jurors as possible,' or 'Don't get any blacks on this jury.'
Procedural Posture:
- Randall Lamont Griffith was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Kentucky (a state trial court).
- The Supreme Court of Kentucky (the state's highest court) affirmed Griffith's conviction.
- Willie Davis Brown was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma (a federal trial court).
- The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (an intermediate federal appellate court) affirmed Brown's conviction.
- Both Griffith and Brown filed petitions for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
- While their petitions were pending, the Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, which established a new rule regarding peremptory challenges.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them to decide the retroactivity of the Batson rule.
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Issue:
Does a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure, which constitutes a 'clear break' with past precedent, apply retroactively to all criminal convictions that were pending on direct review or not yet final at the time the rule was decided?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Blackmun
Yes. A new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past. The Court adopts the reasoning of Justice Harlan, concluding that failing to apply a new rule to all cases pending on direct review violates two basic norms of constitutional adjudication. First, the nature of judicial review requires the Court to adjudicate specific cases and apply its current best understanding of constitutional principles to all similar cases to maintain judicial integrity and avoid acting like a legislature. Second, selective application of new rules creates an 'actual inequity' by violating the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same, making the benefit of a new rule a matter of pure chance based on which case the Court happens to select to announce the rule.
Concurrence - Justice Powell
Yes. Justice Powell joined the majority, stating he had long been persuaded by Justice Harlan's reasoning on retroactivity. He views the decision as an important step toward ending the confusion caused by the prior case-by-case approach. He notes that the Court's opinion carefully leaves open the question of retroactivity for cases on collateral (habeas corpus) review and expressed hope that the Court would adopt the other part of Justice Harlan's view, which would generally deny retroactive application in habeas cases.
Dissent - Justice White
No. The Court should adhere to the traditional three-factor test from Stovall v. Denno for all retroactivity questions and should not distinguish between cases on direct and collateral review. The dissent argues that the 'clear break' exception is necessary to protect the justifiable reliance of prosecutors and judges on established precedent like Swain v. Alabama. The reasons given in Allen v. Hardy for not applying Batson retroactively on collateral review—namely, the reliance on the old rule and the disruption to the administration of justice—apply with equal force to cases on direct review. The majority's new rule penalizes this justifiable reliance and creates its own fairness problems by treating cases on direct and collateral review differently.
Dissent - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. The Chief Justice joined Justice White's dissent, agreeing that under the current retroactivity jurisprudence, the Court erred in rejecting the 'clear break' exception for the Batson rule. He stated a personal willingness to adopt Justice Harlan's complete approach (retroactive on direct review, non-retroactive on collateral review), but since the Court was only adopting half of it, he joined the dissent arguing to maintain the existing framework.
Analysis:
This decision fundamentally changed the doctrine of retroactivity for new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. It established a firm, bright-line rule that all new rules apply to cases not yet final, completely eliminating the 'clear break' exception and the multi-factor Stovall test for cases on direct review. This holding prioritizes the principle of treating similarly situated defendants equally over the state's interest in the finality of convictions and reliance on old precedents. By creating a sharp distinction between direct and collateral review, the case solidified a bifurcated system for retroactivity that the Court would continue to develop in subsequent cases like Teague v. Lane.
