Griffith v. Jones
1992 WL 310336, 602 N.E.2d 107, 1992 Ind. LEXIS 239 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act narrowly limits a trial court's authority to make preliminary determinations regarding medical review panels to specific matters under the Indiana Trial Rules, precluding it from instructing the panel on definitions, evidence, or the form and substance of its expert opinion.
Facts:
- Jon Jones was admitted to Parkview Memorial Hospital in Fort Wayne, Indiana, to undergo a femoral angiography, a procedure to be performed by Dr. Griffith.
- Jones was not advised by Dr. Griffith that there was a risk of death associated with the femoral angiography procedure.
- After the angiography was performed, Jones suffered anaphylactic shock brought on by a reaction to the radiographic contrast dye used during the procedure.
- Dr. Griffith immediately gave the patient epinephrine, but because the crash cart, which Dr. Griffith was charged with stocking, did not have diluted intravenous epinephrine, it was injected intramuscularly.
- Attempts to resuscitate Jones were unsuccessful, and he died.
Procedural Posture:
- Carol Jones, in her capacity as personal representative of Jon Jones' estate, filed a proposed complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance, requesting the convening of a medical review panel under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.
- Jones filed a motion for preliminary determination of law in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, requesting that the court preliminarily determine that the medical review panel was precluded from rendering an expert opinion on the issue of informed consent.
- The U.S. District Court complied with Jones' request and issued a decision.
- Dr. Griffith appealed the U.S. District Court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Appellant: Dr. Griffith; Appellee: Jones).
- The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's decision, holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render such a preliminary determination in the nature of an advisory opinion.
- Immediately following that decision, Jones filed another motion for preliminary determination in the Allen County Superior Court, from which the venue was changed to the Noble Superior Court.
- In this motion, Jones requested that the court order the medical review panel to find material issues of fact not requiring expert opinion on liability for informed consent, construe the term 'a factor' in Ind. Code § 16-9.5-9-7(d), and enter partial summary judgment.
- Dr. Griffith countered with a request that the court order the medical review panel chairman to exclude certain evidence from the plaintiff's panel submission.
- The Noble Superior Court (trial court) issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, holding, among other things, that Indiana adopted the 'prudent patient' standard, that the panel could not render an expert opinion on this standard, and that the phrase 'a factor' lowers the traditional threshold of causation, and denied Dr. Griffith's motion to exclude evidence.
- Dr. Griffith appealed this trial court order to the Indiana Court of Appeals (Appellant: Dr. Griffith; Appellee: Jones).
- The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in its entirety, upholding its determination of the 'prudent patient' standard and its instructions to the medical review panel chairman, as well as its denial of Jones' motion for partial summary judgment.
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Issue:
Does a trial court, under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, have the authority to issue preliminary rulings that dictate the content, definitions, evidence, or form of a medical review panel's expert opinion?
Opinions:
Majority - Krahulik, Justice
No, a trial court does not have the authority under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act to issue preliminary rulings that dictate the content, definitions, evidence, or form of a medical review panel's expert opinion. The court emphasized that the legislature intended for medical review panels to function in an "informal and reasonable manner," as previously held in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. (1980). The power granted to trial courts under Ind. Code § 16-9.5-10-1 to "preliminarily determine any affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be preliminarily determined under the Indiana Rules of Procedure" must be narrowly construed. This power is specifically limited to affirmative defenses under Trial Rule 8(C), issues of law or fact under Trial Rule 12(B), (C), and (D), and compelling discovery under Trial Rules 26 through 37. The court explicitly stated that trial courts lack jurisdiction to instruct the panel concerning definitions of terms, the evidence it may consider, or the form or substance of its opinion, as such actions would undermine the panel's intended informal function.
Concurring - Shepard, C.J., and Givan, J.
Yes, the trial court exceeded its authority by dictating to the medical review panel. Justices Shepard and Givan concurred with the majority's conclusion that the trial court's preliminary rulings exceeded its statutory authority under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - DeBruler and Dickson, JJ.
Yes, the trial court exceeded its authority by dictating to the medical review panel. Justices DeBruler and Dickson concurred with the majority's main holding regarding the trial court's limited authority over medical review panels. However, they dissented as to the role of expert witnesses in informed consent cases and the approval of Culbertson v. Mernitz, a related case decided simultaneously, indicating a disagreement on an ancillary legal point not central to the direct issue of the trial court's authority over the panel.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the limited scope of judicial intervention in the medical review panel process under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. By narrowly construing a trial court's power to make preliminary determinations, the Supreme Court reinforces the legislature's intent for the panels to function informally as expert advisory bodies. This ruling ensures that judicial oversight does not prematurely influence the panel's independent medical opinion, preserving the integrity of the statutory scheme. Future cases will rely on this precedent to challenge trial court orders that seek to pre-empt or direct the panel's deliberative process, thus protecting the panel's role as a neutral, expert filter for medical malpractice claims.
