Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc.
261 F.3d 1026, 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 4282, 12 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 248 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A technical violation of the ADA's prohibition against pre-employment medical inquiries (§ 12112(d)(2)(A)) does not, by itself, automatically entitle a plaintiff to nominal damages or allow for punitive damages; there must be proof of actual injury through intentional discrimination. A plaintiff is not a 'prevailing party' entitled to attorney's fees under a 'catalyst theory' without a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.
Facts:
- Steeltek, Inc. included two questions on its employment application: “Have you received Worker’s Compensation or Disability Income payments? If yes, describe.” and “Have you physical defects which preclude you from performing certain jobs? If yes, describe.”
- Randy D. Griffin applied for a job with Steeltek, Inc.
- Griffin answered the worker's compensation question but not the physical defects question on his application.
- Steeltek's hiring manager did not interview Griffin because the face of his application did not indicate he had the requisite experience for the job.
- Steeltek instead rehired an experienced individual who had been recently laid off and whom the manager had attempted to locate before running the advertisement Griffin responded to.
- Griffin claimed that being asked the prohibited questions caused him emotional and mental distress, as he had filed worker’s compensation claims that he would either have to reveal or lie about.
- Griffin also claimed Steeltek actually discriminated against him by refusing to hire him because of his answer (and/or failure to answer) the prohibited questions.
Procedural Posture:
- Randy D. Griffin filed a lawsuit against Steeltek, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging violation of § 12112(d)(2)(A) of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1991.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant-appellee Steeltek, Inc.
- Griffin filed post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of nominal damages, for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, and for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
- The district court denied all of Griffin’s post-trial motions.
- Griffin appealed the district court’s order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Griffin as Plaintiff-Appellant, Steeltek, Inc. as Defendant-Appellee).
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Issue:
1. Does a technical violation of ADA § 12112(d)(2)(A) (prohibiting pre-employment medical inquiries) automatically constitute a compensable injury entitling a plaintiff to nominal damages or allowing for punitive damages, absent proof of intentional discrimination and actual harm? 2. Is a plaintiff who proves a technical violation of ADA § 12112(d)(2)(A) but fails to secure a judgment on the merits entitled to attorney's fees under a 'catalyst for change' theory if the defendant discontinued the prohibited practice?
Opinions:
Majority - Seymour, Circuit Judge
No, a technical violation of ADA § 12112(d)(2)(A) does not automatically result in a compensable injury for nominal damages, nor does it allow for punitive damages without proof of intentional discrimination and actual harm. No, a plaintiff who proves a technical violation but fails to secure a judgment is not entitled to attorney's fees under a 'catalyst for change' theory. The court reasoned that compensatory damages, including nominal damages, under the ADA are only available if the plaintiff establishes not only a technical violation of § 12112(d)(2)(A) but also that the employer 'engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination' resulting in a cognizable injury. The jury in this case concluded, on sufficient evidence, that Mr. Griffin suffered no injury from being asked the prohibited questions and thus rejected his claim of intentional discrimination. Steeltek had presented testimony that the questions played no part in the hiring decision and that Mr. Griffin was not interviewed due to lack of requisite experience, with an experienced former employee being rehired instead. Because Mr. Griffin failed to establish injury by intentional discrimination, he was not entitled to nominal or punitive damages. Punitive damages specifically require proof of discriminatory practice with malice or reckless indifference, which was not met here. Furthermore, Mr. Griffin was not a 'prevailing party' entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, the court affirmed that a plaintiff who fails to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree is not entitled to attorney's fees, even if the litigation prompted a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct (the 'catalyst theory').
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the causation and injury requirements for plaintiffs seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act for violations of pre-employment medical inquiry prohibitions. By requiring proof of intentional discrimination and actual injury beyond a mere technical violation, the Tenth Circuit established a higher bar for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. Moreover, the decision reinforces the Supreme Court's rejection of the 'catalyst theory,' narrowing the circumstances under which plaintiffs can claim 'prevailing party' status for attorney's fees, thereby potentially impacting strategic litigation decisions and settlement negotiations in future ADA cases.
