Griffin v. State
1989 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 29, 1989 WL 8702, 765 S.W.2d 422 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The 'cat-out-of-the-bag' theory, which suggests a subsequent confession is involuntary because an earlier, inadmissible confession psychologically disadvantaged the accused, is not sufficient alone to render a later confession involuntary under the Due Process Clause unless there is actual coercion or a demonstrated causal link, even for juveniles, though juvenile status is a relevant factor in the totality of circumstances.
Facts:
- On June 29, 1983, Gerald Spencer was found strangled in his Dallas home, having been dead for several days.
- On July 13, 1983, Homicide Investigators King and Watts, acting on an anonymous tip, went to the home of Velma Langston, appellant's aunt, where they found glassware taken from Spencer's home.
- Langston and the appellant agreed to go to the police station to explain their possession of the glassware; neither was under arrest at this point.
- At the station, Investigator King discovered the appellant was a juvenile while taking her affidavit.
- Around 4:00 p.m., after learning Langston's fingerprints matched those at the murder scene, King arrested the appellant and read her Miranda rights, including that any statement could be used against her.
- Appellant then orally stated, 'I was in the house, but I didn’t kill him,' and subsequently 'discussed' the murder with King, providing facts he later used for a written statement.
- Around 5:30 p.m., appellant was taken before a magistrate who administered specific juvenile warnings required by V.T.C.A., Family Code § 51.09(b)(1), but this magistrate was not informed of King's prior discussion with appellant.
- Appellant then gave King a written statement implicating herself as a party to the murder, which she signed in the presence of a second magistrate at about 8:45 p.m. after being advised of her rights again, with no law enforcement personnel present.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellant, a sixteen-year-old juvenile, was certified and tried as an adult and subsequently convicted as a party to murder in criminal district court in Texas.
- A jury assessed her punishment at fifteen years in the Texas Department of Corrections.
- The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed her conviction, holding that her written confession was involuntary and its admission violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
- The State filed a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment render a juvenile's subsequent written confession involuntary if she was not informed that her earlier, statutorily inadmissible oral statement could not be used against her, even when the written confession was obtained after proper Miranda warnings and additional juvenile safeguards?
Opinions:
Majority - Clinton, Judge
No, the Due Process Clause does not render a juvenile's subsequent written confession involuntary merely because she was unaware her earlier, statutorily inadmissible oral statement could not be used against her, especially when the written confession was obtained after proper Miranda warnings and additional juvenile safeguards. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that while juvenile protections under the Family Code apply to pre-transfer confessions (overruling Swink v. State in this respect), these state-level protections do not define the parameters of federal due process voluntariness. Relying on Oregon v. Elstad, the Court reasoned that an earlier unwarned or statutorily inadmissible (but not actually coerced) statement does not automatically 'taint' a subsequent, properly warned, and otherwise voluntary confession. The 'cat-out-of-the-bag' theory, while having 'some intuitive behavioral validity,' is insufficient to establish involuntariness for federal due process absent actual coercion or some 'but for' testimony from the juvenile linking the prior inadmissible statement to the subsequent confession. The State's compliance with Miranda and Family Code § 51.09(b)(1) warnings for the written statement, coupled with the absence of duress and the review by a magistrate, sufficed to meet the burden of proving voluntariness under the totality of circumstances.
Concurring - Teague, J.
Justice Teague concurred in the result.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the 'cat-out-of-the-bag' theory in Texas, particularly concerning juvenile confessions and the interplay between state statutory protections and federal due process standards. By aligning with Oregon v. Elstad, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established that an initial statutorily inadmissible (but not coerced) confession does not automatically invalidate a subsequent, properly warned confession, even for juveniles. The decision reinforces the 'totality of the circumstances' test for voluntariness and places a higher burden on the defendant to show actual coercion or a direct causal link if they wish to invoke the 'cat-out-of-the-bag' theory for federal due process purposes. This ruling ensures that state-specific juvenile protections do not, by themselves, create a federal constitutional violation regarding confession voluntariness.
