Griffin v. State
455 S.W.2d 882 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
An unlawful combination or concert of action to commit a crime can be proven by circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of a pre-arranged plan or communication of intent is not necessary if it can be inferred from the parties' simultaneous and connected actions in pursuing the same unlawful objective.
Facts:
- Appellant Griffin's car overturned in a ditch, and a crowd gathered.
- Police officers Harold Vines and David Ederington arrived at the scene.
- When Officer Vines asked who was driving, Griffin stepped forward, made a defiant statement, and advanced on Vines with his fists.
- Griffin began hitting Officer Vines, who attempted to defend himself.
- A group of young men from the crowd then 'swarmed' Officer Vines, joining Griffin in striking and kicking the officer.
- Simultaneously, two or three other individuals from the crowd attacked Officer Ederington, knocking him to the ground.
- While being beaten by Griffin and the others, Officer Vines drew his pistol and shot Griffin.
- After the shot, Griffin and the others retreated but continued yelling threats at the officers.
Procedural Posture:
- Griffin was charged in the circuit court (trial court) with assisting in the assault of a police officer.
- At the conclusion of the trial, Griffin made a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, which the court denied.
- A jury found Griffin guilty of the charged offense.
- Griffin filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied.
- Griffin (appellant) appealed the judgment of conviction to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.
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Issue:
Does sufficient evidence of a common unlawful purpose exist to convict a defendant of assisting in an assault, when the defendant initiates an attack on an officer and others from a crowd immediately join in, even without direct proof of a conspiracy or communicated intent?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice John A. Fogleman
Yes. Sufficient evidence exists to establish a common unlawful purpose because a concert of action can be inferred from the circumstances. The law does not require direct evidence of a conspiracy or an explicitly communicated plan among participants. Citing precedents like Parker v. State, the court reasoned that an unlawful combination may be proved by circumstances where two or more persons pursue the same unlawful object through connected acts, even if those acts appear independent. In this case, Griffin initiated the assault, and the crowd's immediate, simultaneous, and concerted attack on both Officer Vines and Officer Ederington provided a sufficient factual basis for a jury to infer a common plan and intent to assault the officers. The secrecy inherent in such understandings means that proof must often come from circumstantial evidence showing the parties' actions were 'mere parts of some complete whole.'
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the principle that concert of action can be established circumstantially, which is critical for prosecuting crimes involving group or mob violence. It clarifies that a prosecutor does not need direct evidence of an explicit agreement to prove a common criminal purpose. The precedent allows juries to infer intent and agreement from the defendants' coordinated actions alone. This lowers the evidentiary bar in cases where proving a pre-meditated conspiracy is difficult, ensuring that individuals who participate in a spontaneous group crime can be held accountable for the collective action, not just their individual conduct.
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