Griffin v. County School Board Of Prince Edward County
1966 U.S. App. LEXIS 5757, 363 F.2d 206 (1966)
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Rule of Law:
A court's power to punish civil contempt extends to actions taken to remove the subject matter of litigation beyond the court's control, even if no explicit restraining order was in place, provided the party knew such action would thwart a potential adverse decree on appeal.
Facts:
- The County School Board of Prince Edward County had previously closed public schools to avoid desegregation, while a private corporation, Prince Edward County Educational Foundation, operated a segregated school for white children.
- The Board disbursed public funds as tuition grants to parents, which were used to support these private segregated schools.
- In July 1964, the State Board of Education authorized the reimbursement of parents for tuition grants for the 1963-64 session, which had been previously enjoined, leading to a temporary injunction against these retroactive payments.
- Following a request from the Fourth Circuit Clerk for a stipulation that no tuition grants would be paid pending an appeal, the Board of Supervisors refused the request on August 4, 1964.
- During the night of August 4 and early morning of August 5, 1964, the Board of Supervisors met, substantially enlarged tuition grants for the 1964-65 session, and ordered payment of one-half of the total grants before September 1, 1964.
- White parents were immediately notified, and approximately $180,000 in checks was distributed and mostly cashed by 9:00 A.M. on August 5, 1964.
- Some 1217 tuition grant applications for the 1964-65 school year were processed during that night and morning, with each applicant receiving half the amount, predominantly for children enrolled in the Prince Edward School Foundation schools.
Procedural Posture:
- Negro children and parents (plaintiffs, appellants here) filed a supplemental complaint in District Court.
- On November 16, 1961, the District Court issued an injunction commanding the Board and State not to pay further tuition grants while public schools of Prince Edward County remained closed.
- In the summer of 1962, the District Court resumed consideration of the issue, ordered the schools reopened, and continued the injunction of tuition grants.
- The Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) stayed this decree awaiting a decision in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
- The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the abstention order in Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), approving the District Court's injunction and reopening orders.
- Upon receipt of the mandate, the District Court held a hearing on June 17, 1964, and on June 25, 1964, ordered the Prince Edward's Board of Supervisors to appropriate necessary moneys to open and maintain public schools on a nondiscriminatory basis.
- On June 29, 1964, the plaintiffs moved the District Court to permanently enjoin the processing of tuition grants and to require the Board to augment public school funds.
- On July 1, 1964, the State Board of Education authorized reimbursement of parents for tuition grants for the 1963-64 session, which had been enjoined, leading plaintiffs to obtain a temporary injunction barring such retroactive payments.
- At a hearing on July 9, 1964, the Board agreed to a permanent injunction of the proposed reimbursement of 1963-64 grants, but the District Court declined to enjoin future grants.
- On July 17, 1964, the plaintiffs noted an appeal to the Fourth Circuit regarding the District Court's refusal to enjoin future grants.
- On July 28, 1964, appellants moved the Fourth Circuit to accelerate the appeal.
- On August 4, 1964, the Clerk of the Fourth Circuit requested the Board of Supervisors to stipulate that no tuition grants would be paid pending appeal, but the Board refused.
- On August 13, 1964, in their appeal, the appellants moved to cite the Board for contempt of the Fourth Circuit and for an order restoring the moneys distributed on August 4-5, 1964.
- On December 2, 1964, the Fourth Circuit (in Griffin v. Board of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486) directed the District Court to enjoin the Board from paying any tuition grants to segregated private schools but remanded the contempt motion for "further inquiries into the facts."
- Pursuant to the remittitur, the District Court on February 8, 1965, cited the individual members of the Board of Supervisors to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with its July 9, 1964, injunction against retroactive 1963-64 payments.
- After a hearing on April 23, 1965, the District Court concluded that the payments made on August 4-5, 1964, did not cover school years prior to 1964-65 and therefore were not violative of the July 9, 1964, order, dismissing the show cause order against the Board members.
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Issue:
Does a court of appeals have the power to hold a party in civil contempt for disbursing public funds to private segregated schools to deliberately thwart a potential adverse ruling on appeal, even when no explicit injunction against such disbursement was currently in force from the appellate court?
Opinions:
Majority - Albert V. Bryan, Circuit Judge
Yes, a court of appeals has the power to hold a party in civil contempt for actions taken to deliberately thwart a potential adverse ruling on appeal, even without an explicit injunction from the appellate court. The Board's actions of disbursing funds to private segregated schools during the pendency of an appeal, and after being asked to stipulate against such payments, constituted "resistance to its [this court's] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command" under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). The Board was acutely aware that the ultimate decree on appeal would likely enjoin such grants, and their actions were an attempt to put the subject matter of the litigation (the funds for tuition grants) beyond the court's control and thwart the impact of any adverse decree, rendering a potential victory "but a barren victory." The court cited Merrimack River Savings Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527 (1911), which held that removing the subject matter of an appeal beyond the court's control is, in itself, contempt, and Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932), which affirmed this for lower courts, noting that diversion of the res was contumacious because it "tended to defeat any decree which the court might ultimately make in the cause." The present case involved specific funds for a specific purpose (tuition grants to segregated schools), making the disbursement a serious impairment to the appeal. The court found the Board of Supervisors and its individual members guilty of civil contempt and ordered them to restore the disbursed funds. The court also held that the District Court erred in reducing attorney's fees based on counsel's failure to pursue a state court ruling and directed a reappraisal of the fees.
Dissenting - Haynsworth, Chief Judge
No, the court does not have the power to adjudge the Board in contempt because the statutory limitations on contempt power, 18 U.S.C. § 401, require an existing "writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command" to be disobeyed or resisted, which was not present here. Chief Judge Haynsworth agreed that the Supervisors' conduct was "unconscionable" but argued that federal courts, unlike the Supreme Court, are bound by 18 U.S.C. § 401. This statute, particularly Section 401(3), limits contempt power to cases of disobedience or resistance to an existing lawful court order or process. He contended that no temporary restraining order or injunction from the Fourth Circuit prevented the Board's actions, and the requested stipulation by the Clerk of the Court did not fit the statutory definitions. The term "process," in the context of other court commands, traditionally refers to court-issued papers embodying commands or judgments, not merely the pendency of an appeal. Expanding this term would contravene the limiting purpose of the statute. He cited Ex parte Buskirk, 72 F. 14 (4th Cir. 1896), where the Fourth Circuit previously held that anticipatory avoidance of a potential decree or violation of a stipulation was not punishable contempt under the statute, and noted that the majority effectively overruled Buskirk without mentioning it. He distinguished Merrimack River Savings Bank as applying to the Supreme Court, which may have inherent powers beyond the statute, and Lamb v. Cramer because it did not explicitly mention or interpret the statute, and could be interpreted as falling under § 401(2) (misbehavior of officers) rather than § 401(3). He concluded that the disbursement of funds, while unwarranted, did not abort the appeal or frustrate adjudication of the main issue and that the Supervisors were not officers of the court punishable under § 401(2).
Analysis:
This case significantly broadened the interpretation of a federal court's civil contempt power under 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), particularly concerning actions taken during an ongoing appeal without an explicit injunction. By holding that purposeful pre-emptive dissipation of the subject matter of litigation, intended to frustrate a future decree, constitutes contempt, the Fourth Circuit established that judicial authority to preserve the integrity of the appellate process extends beyond formal, explicit orders. This ruling reinforces the judiciary's ability to deter bad faith actions designed to render future judgments moot or ineffective, ensuring that parties cannot unilaterally undermine the court's power through strategic maneuvers during litigation. It sets a precedent that parties must respect the potential outcomes of appellate review and avoid actions that would make a reversal "a barren victory."
